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ABSTRACT
The primary purpose of this study is to formulate, estimate and 
compare monetary policy reaction functions for the United Kingdom, 
West Germany, and Canada. For each country, the growth rate of the 
monetary base is estimated as a linear function of eight independent 
variables—the interest rate variable, the budget de fic it variable, 
the wage rate variable, the price variable, the international reserves 
variable, the exchange rate variable, a trade balance variable and an 
economic activ ity  variable (e .g ., the output gap, the output ra tio , or 
the unemployment rate variable). Alternative measures of a number of 
these variables are employed.
The Final Prediction Error criterion in conjunction with the 
specific gravity criterion has been used to determine the lag length 
for each explanatory variable and the order in which independent 
variables enter the equations. Reaction functions, thus specified, 
are estimated using the Ordinary Least Squares and instrumental 
variables techniques. I f  preliminary results suggest the presence of 
serial correlation among residuals, estimates are obtained using the 
Cochrane-Orcutt iterative  procedure for serial correlation correction. 
Restricted versions of the reaction functions are also estimated after 
dropping s ta tis tica lly  insignificant variables from the fu lly  
specified reaction functions.
The estimated reaction functions indicate that monetary policies 
in the United Kingdom and West Germany have been permanently affected 
by some external trade balance measure—the effective exchange rate in 
the former case and international reserves in the la tte r. The 
monetary base in Canada is affected by changes in the output gap, 
interest rate changes and budget v^ttcUs, _
x i i
CHAPTER I
NATURE AND SCOPE OF STUDY
Inflation is one of the most prominent problems faced by developed 
as well as less developed countries. I t  has been generally agreed upon 
that "inflation is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon"; thus, 
to understand the inflationary process i t  is essential to analyze the 
factors that contribute to rapid money growth. The purpose of this 
study is to explore the factors responsible for monetary expansion in 
the United Kingdom, West Germany, and Canada.
Prior to the early 1960's, almost a ll macroeconomic models 
specified variables determined within the governmental sector as 
exogenous. Changes in these variables constituted shocks to the 
system and empirical studies employing the assumptions that government 
variables were exogeneous estimated multipliers for these variables.
More recently, however, there has been a growing volume of 
research in which the primary purpose has been to endogenize policy 
variables. This research has originated from different sources. I t  
has been carried on by a number of economists [e.g. Dewald-Johnson 
(1963), Reuber (1964), Havrilesky (1967)] concerned with analyzing the 
performance of policymakers. These economists have typically  
estimated reaction functions for the monetary authorities. In some 
cases they have attempted to judge whether the monetary authorities
1
2actually implemented the ir announced policy objectives; in other 
cases, reaction functions have been estimated to ascertain the 
im plicit trade-off among various policy targets.
Econometric model-builders interested in improving their estimates 
of structural and reduced form parameters have also contributed 
significantly to this f ie ld . As Wood (1967) pointed out, to treat the 
monetary policy variable as exogeneous, while in fact i t  is influenced 
by economic and other variables, constitutes a specification error. 
Misspecification of the model results in inconsistent and biased 
parameter estimates. Wood (p. 137) asserted " I f  monetary policy 
actions do in fact affect the behavior of private institutions and 
individuals, i t  is necessary to treat the Federal Reserve behavioral 
equations as part of a larger model in order to obtain consistent 
estimates of the parameters of those equations".
I f  government policy variables are endogeneous, assuming them to 
be exogeneous may lead to simultaneous equation bias in the estimation 
of a structural econometric model. According to Goldfeld and Blinder 
(1972, p. 593) " ...th e  only 'rig h t' way to estimate policy multipliers 
econometrically is to include in his [economist's] model reaction 
functions for the fiscal authorities and for the Federal Reserve 
System...". They argue that the m ultiplier would be biased i f  
policymakers react systematically to the state of the econonjy and this 
systematic reaction is not accounted for in the model.
The primary purpose of this study is to contribute to this 
research by formulating, estimating and comparing monetary policy 
reaction functions for the United Kingdom, West Germany, and Canada. 
Reaction functions quantify the manner in which the monetary
authorities a lte r the money supply in response to various goals such 
as price s ta b ility , fu ll employment, balance of payments equilibrium, 
and economic growth. Extensive empirical evidence is available on the 
estimation of the U.S. money supply reaction function (as 1s evident 
from the number of studies covered in Chapter I I ) ,  but comparatively 
fewer studies are available for the countries covered in this study. 
In most previous studies, a-priori restrictions are imposed on the 
model 1n terms of the predetermined lag length. An attempt has been 
made in the present study to avoid the problems associated with the 
imposition of the same lag length on a ll explanatory variables. A 
better understanding of the actual behavior of monetary authorities in 
the U.K., West Germany, and Canada would help make fiscal policy 
makers in these countries better equipped to handle such macro 
problems as inflation and unemployment. Empirical estimation of 
reaction functions w ill fa c ilita te  the understanding of the monetary 
policy mechanism 1n these countries.
In this study we focus on the growth rate of the monetary base 
rather than on the money supply. The growth rate of the monetary base 
is estimated as a linear function of changes in economic variables. 
Reaction functions are estimated using ordinary least square 
procedures. Data are analyzed using a Time Series Processor (TSP) 
package. Rather than Imposing an a r t if ic ia l lag structure, 
Information contained in the data set is used to determine the lag 
length for each variable. The Final Prediction Error (FPE) test of 
Hsiao (1981) 1s used in conjunction with the Specific Gravity (SG) 
criterion of Caines, Keng and Sethi (1981) to determine the lag length 
on each variable and the order in which explanatory variables enter
the money growth function.
I t  should be mentioned that this study does not attempt to 
investigate several related issues. No consideration is given to 
explaining the determination of central bank instruments such as open 
market transactions or operating targets such as short-term interest 
rates or some aggregate of bank reserves. Rather, the focus is 
completely on the nominal quantity of the monetary base, and i t  is 
assumed that its  value is approximately determined by the monetary 
authority in each country.
A brief outline of the study follows. Chapter I I  contains a 
summary of previous empirical research on money supply reaction 
functions for the United States and other industrial countries. In
Chapter I I I  the theoretical framework underlying the empirical
analysis of this study is outlined, followed by the detailed 
specification of the monetary base equations and the expected sign on 
the variables. Chapter IV contains the results for the United 
Kingdom, West Germany, and Canada. The final chapter (Chapter V)
summarizes the study and the results.
Appendix A consists of definitions of variables used in the 
estimation of the reaction functions.
CHAPTER I I
A SURVEY OF THE LITERATURE
Before elaborating on the model used in this study, i t  is useful 
to survey the existing empirical literature  on the reaction function 
estimation.
I .  Different Approaches To Explanatory Variables
A number of view-points about monetary expansion can be distingu­
ished. Many monetarists suggest that large government deficits may be 
a major source of monetary expansion. Large scale fiscal deficits  
occurring year a fter year can not be financed by the sale of 
government bonds to private individuals and non-banking institutions 
without destabilizing financial markets. Under such conditions, the 
alternative option available to the government is to finance deficits  
by money creation.
As pointed out by several monetarists, the sale of government 
securities to the private sector w ill exert upward pressure on 
interest rates. To the extent that the central bank is concerned with 
avoiding large fluctuations in interest rates, i t  w ill buy at least a 
part of the outstanding government securities, thus monetizing a part 
of the government debt. However, the central bank w ill not use 
accommodative monetary policy i f  its  concern with macro-stabilization 
objectives (such as a low inflation rate or balance of payments
5
objective) is greater than its  concern for the interest rate objective 
(McMi11 in -  Beard, 1980).
Another channel which is operative even in the presence of 
unchanged Federal Reserve behavior is discussed by McMi11 in and Beard 
(1980). The increased sale of government securities issued to finance 
a budget d e fic it w ill lead to increased short-term interest rates. 
Higher interest rates can cause an expansion in the money supply 
through changes in private sector responses such as a reduction in the 
ratios of excess reserves/demand deposits and time deposits/demand 
deposits. This expansion in the money supply w ill take place even i f  
the monetary authorities' behavior remains unchanged in response to 
changes in market interest rates.
Many Keynesians insist that cost push factors such as wage or oil 
price increases provide a major explanation for the behavior of the 
money stock. Increases in money wages in excess of increases in labor 
productivity would lead to higher unit labor costs and price level.
I f  money wages and prices are inflexible downward and the monetary
authorities do not expand the money stock in response to increased
nominal wages, the level of employment and output would decline.
Because of the squeeze in real balances, financial markets would be
unstable, i . e . ,  interest rates w ill tend to move upward. To the extent 
that the authorities are concerned with financial s tab ility  and the 
employment objective, they w ill be constrained to accommodate wage 
Increases.*
*Gordon (1977) has noted the effect of wage increases on money supply 
"...Sooner or later the central bank w ill have to raise the money 
supply in order to accommodate the higher transaction demand for money 
created by higher wages..." (p. 415).
Another factor that can affect the money supply process in an open 
economy is the balance of payments. Since the monetary base is 
comprised of the sum of domestic credit and net foreign assets of the 
central bank, changes in net foreign credit arising due to the changes 
in the balance of payments situation may lead to changes in the 
monetary base and the money supply. Thus, a balance of payments 
surplus can cause monetary expansion.
The purpose here is to present a comprehensive review of the 
available literature  on money supply determinants. The emphasis is on 
studies in which an attempt has been made to estimate the central 
bank's reaction function. I f  the monetary authorities react 
systematically to the state of the econoiny, estimation of this 
systematic reaction pattern is warranted in order to detect the 
determinants of monetary policy.
I I .  Estimation Results: Money Supply Reaction Functions 
A. U. S. Studies
A summary of some previous reaction function studies for the U.S. 
is reported in Table 1. These studies are presented in chronological 
order. Most reaction function studies start on the assumption that 
the central bank tries to maximize some policy objective function (or 
minimize the loss function) with appropriate weights assigned to 
price s ta b ility , fu ll employment, interest rate s tab ility  and the
Most often the loss function (objective function) is quadratic with 
linear constraints and an additive error term. The optimization 
process results in a linear reaction function which is amenable to 
statis tica l analysis.
Table 1. S<*mry l i s t  o f Major Hooey Supply Reaction-Function Studies fo r  United SUtes.
Study Sm* 1« Period* Regressend laggedBegressand U
1 Dewald-Johnson (1963)
2 Havrllesky (1967)
3 Mood (1967)
4 Froyen (1974)
S Havrllesky, Sapp end 
SchwelUer (197S)
6 Berro (1978)
7 Moore (1979)
8 McMlllln-Beard (I960)
9 Abrews, Froyen 
end Maud (1960)
10 Hartwrger-Zwlck (1981)
11 Levy (1981)
12 Barth, Sickles
end Mefst (1982)
13 McHUHn-Beard (1962)
19S2:1*1961:4:Q
19S2:1-1965:4;Q
19S2:1-1963:4:Q
19S3:2-1961:1:H 
1961:2-1969:1;lt 
1969:2«1972:2;M
Easy Money
firlods; N Ight aoney 
periods;*
1941-1976;A
1946-1976,4
19Sl:2-1977;2;M
19S2:2-1976:2;Q
Money Supply (Ml, K2, 
log Ml)
Total reserves
Gov't, securities held 
by the Federal Reserve
Monetary Base (A )
Federal Funds Rate
Money Supply (Ml) 
Monetary Base (A )
1953:M976:4;Q Unborroued Reserves
1970:3-1977:3iM
19S4:1976;4 
1961:1974:4
Federal Funds Rate 
Money Supply (Ml)
19S2:1-1978:4;Q Monetary Base (A )
19S3:1-I976:2:N
1961 •  1974:4 
1961 -  1978:4
Monetary Base (A )  
Money Supply (Ml)
level
Level
Change (F irs t difference)
Percent Chsnoe 
(growth rate)
Annual Growth Rate
leve l. F irs t 
Difference, Percentage 
Change
Level
Level
4nnuat Growth Rate 
F irs t Difference
Monthly Percentage 
Change
Annual Growth Rate
♦ 0 0
♦ -  0^
O - e
14 Allen end SmIUi (1983)
15 Leney-Willett (19B3)
1944:1-1980:4;!/’ HontUiy I m  (M )
I960 -  197M Honer Supply (HI)
Quarterly Growth Rates 
Change
See notes and definitions of variables on pp. 9-12.
T ¥ FES
-T/P- CTS) IR r  FEDV SUR Ftp DCF M M OEBT (GAP) (OEF) 6 T ED
iil
r
v
♦ 0
of
0»
♦  ♦  ♦
(0
♦ 0
»*0
(-) to
CO
9Notes:
Ml refers to the narrow money supply defined as C+D
M2 refers to a broader definition of the money supply measured as
C+D+T, 
where:
C = Currency,
D = Demand deposits, and 
T = Time deposits in Commercial banks.
+, -  and 0 denote respectively a positive significant sign, 
a negative significant sign and insignificant sign on coefficients 
at the 5% level.
aQ denotes quarterly, A denotes annual and M denotes a monthly 
time unit.
bThis estimation period has been broken into several subperiods to 
test for structural shifts in the money supply function between 
the subperiods. Separate equations have been estimated for ( i )  
1954:1-1961:2, ( i i )  1961:3-1974:4, ( i i i )  1954:1-1974:4; (iv )  
1961:3-1969:3, (v) 1969:4-1980:4, (v i) 1961:3-1980:4 and (v ii)  
1954:1-1980:4.
cAlthough the balance of payments variable was not significant, a 
significant negative coefficient on a proxy variable for foreign 
economic activ ity  (a weighted average of foreign long-term 
interest rates) indicated responsiveness of monetary policy to 
capital flows.
A^ ten year time period (1964:1 -  1974:2, M) was divided into 
several subperiods on the basis of intended "tight" or "easy"
10
monetary policy as stated in the minutes of FOMC monthly meetings. 
Reaction functions for six distinct sub-periods were estimated.
eThese coefficients were significant with different signs in 
different easy money periods.
^This coefficient changed in sign in different tight money periods.
9 A change in the nature of the relationship between money supply 
and federal expenditure was observed. Over the extended sample 
(1954-76) government expenditures, rather than d efic its , 
explained monetary growth, but for a smaller sample period 
(1961-74) the money supply reacted to changes in deficits rather 
than to expenditures.
^The short run interest rate variable has a negative sign but is 
insignificantly different from zero for the monthly data, 
however, for the quarterly data the interest rate coefficient is 
significant at the one percent level with a negative sign.
^This variable is significant for the simplest reaction function 
estimated.
JSignificant at the ten percent level, with the expected positive 
sign in only one of the equations in which the expenditures and 
deficits variables were dropped.
For a longer sample period (1961-78) a positive link was 
established between federal expenditures and money growth, but 
this link was significant only when a d e fic it or a debt variable 
was included in the estimated equation.
^In addition to these variables several dummy variables corres­
ponding to different presidential administrations were included 
to test any shifts in Federal Reserve behavior.
Definition of Variables:
U = Unemployment rate;
P = Inflation rate or the absolute change in price index;
BPS = Balance of payments surplus;
Y/P = Real income;
. Y = Nominal income;
XR = Exchange rate;
r = Short-term interest rate, (different specifications include 
treasury b il l  rate and the federal funds rate);
FEDV = Real federal expenditure relative to normal;
SUR = Detrended federal surplus
[nominal surplus/(Trend real GNP x IPD)];
FED = Detrended government expenditure
[nominal federal expenditure/(Trend real GNP x IPD)];
DEF = Detrended federal d e fic it
[nominal deficit/(Trend real GNP X IPD)];
DEBT = government debt;
W = Wage rate;
M = Money supply (deviations of the money growth rate MI from the 
targeted growth rate);
•fa
Y = Potential GNP (high employment output);
TS = Total sales;
FES = Full employment budget surplus 
G = Nominal federal government expenditures on goods and services 
T = Nominal endogenous federal net tax receipts;
12
GAP = Output gap (difference between actual output and potential 
output);
DFE = Full employment budget d e fic it;
ED = Election dummy variable (This variable is assigned a value 
equal to plus one in the year of an election and one 
preceding year, and is equal to minus one for the two 
following years).
balance of payments equilibrium objectives. This optimization process 
is subject to a set of relationships representing the structure of the 
econony, which generates a trade-off between several objectives. The 
reaction function is derived by solving the firs t-o rder conditions.
In the reaction functions reported in Table 1, a total of seven
3
dependent variables have been used. The choice of the regressand was 
based on either the overall purpose of the author's study or his belief 
regarding the nature of the monetary aggregate which the authorities 
have actually controlled. Dewald and Johnson (1963, hereafter D-J) 
estimated the money supply reaction function primarily to learn about 
the goals trade-off. D-J tried both Ml and M2 (as a monetary policy 
indicator) in the estimated reaction function. They reported a 
slightly higher multiple correlation coefficient adjusted for degrees 
of freedom (R ) for M2, and also that i t  was weaker with respect to 
correct signs and significance levels. Barro (1978) and Hamburger and 
Zwick (1981) have used Ml to estimate the money growth equation and to 
test the deficit-money supply linkage. Abrams, Froyen and Waud (1980) 
preferred the federal funds rate as the dependent variable, since they 
fe lt  that this policy instrument was under the direct control of 
policymakers over their sample period. Havrilesky (1967) rejected 
both the money supply and interest rates as indicators of monetary 
policy in favor of total reserves (adjusted for legal reserve 
requirement changes). He argued that neither the money supply nor 
interest rates were under the direct control of the monetary
3
Different specifications of dependent variables included Ml, M2, 
total reserves, federal funds rate, the Fed's holding of government 
securities,the monetary base and unborrowed reserves.
authorities since they are influenced by exogenous forces. Wood 
(1967) used the government securities held by the Federal Reserve as 
the appropriate dependent variable in the estimated reaction function, 
while the monetary base was chosen as the monetary policy variable by 
Levy (1981), Barth, Sickles and Weist (1982), and Allen-Smith (1983). 
Unborrowed reserves (adjusted for reserve requirement changes) are 
employed as the Federal Reserve's 'policy tool' by McMi11 in-Beard 
(1980). A discussion of individual money supply reaction function 
studies (in chronological order) now follows.
D-J (1963) specified four major goals of the monetary author- 
it ie s —price s ta b ility , high employment, economic growth and a 
satisfactory balance of payments. They also analyzed the trade-off 
among these policy objectives. Empirical evidence indicated that 
during the sample period (1952-1961) high employment and high economic 
growth objectives dominated monetary policy. This was because changes 
in the unemployment rate and real gross national product were found to 
be the major sources of the changes in monetary policy as represented 
by the money supply (Ml and M2). The coefficients on the balance of 
payments variable and price level variable were s ta tis tica lly  
insignificant and had wrong signs, leading them to the conclusion that 
the external balance objective and the price s tab ility  objective did 
not shape monetary policies 1n the sample period under consideration.
In a monetary policy reaction function estimated by Havrilesky 
(1967), total reserves (adjusted for legal reserve requirement 
changes) were regressed on unemployment, the general price level, the 
balance of payments and aggregate demand variables. Quarterly data 
were used for the sample period (1952:1 -  1965:4). Empirical evidence
indicated that the monetary authorities responded systematically to 
changes in the unemployment rate, the price level and aggregate 
demand. All these variables were significant with the expected sign. 
Although the balance of payments variable was not significantly 
different from zero, a significant negative coefficient on a proxy 
variable for foreign economic activ ity  (a weighted average of foreign 
long-term interest rates) indicated responsiveness of monetary policy 
to capital flows.
Wood (1967) investigated Federal Reserve behavior within the
context of the entire economy. The reaction function was formally 
derived using an optimization procedure. The Federal Reserve was
perceived as minimizing a d is u tility  function containing the weighted 
squared sum of deviations of actual from desired values for some basic 
objective variables. This function is minimized subject to the 
constraints that are reduced form equations embodying the perceived 
structure of the economy.
The derived reaction function was estimated using ordinary least 
squares and two-stage least squares procedures for the time period 
1952:1- 1963:4. Quarterly data were employed. Evidence revealed the
systematic response of the Federal Reserve to changes in GNP, the
balance of trade and the price level. Federal Reserve holdings of 
government securities also responded directly to a change in holdings 
of federal securities outside the Treasury.
Froyen (1974) estimated separate functions for the Eisenhower 
(February 1953 - January 1961), Kennedy-Johnson (February 1961-January 
1969), and early Nixon (February 1969-February 1972) regimes. In the 
estimated reaction functions, the monetary base (and adjusted monetary
base) was regressed on the unemployment rate variable, the inflation  
rate variable, the balance of payments surplus, total sales (a proxy 
for the level of economic activ ity ) and the long-term corporate bond 
rate. In addition to these variables he included the federal 
government debt and the fu ll employment budget surplus as fiscal 
policy variables. He found evidence that monetary policy was 
sensitive to the changes in the unemployment rate and the level of 
economic ac tiv ity , irrespective of the po litica l regime. 
Anti-inflationary monetary policy was pursued only during the 
Kennedy-Johnson administration. Over this period (February 
1961-January 1969) monetary policy also responded to the changes in 
fiscal policy variables as is evident from a positive significant sign 
on the debt variable and a negative significant sign on the fu ll 
employment surplus variable.
The hypothesis of a change in the Federal Reserve's behavior 
during different presidential administrations and during the 
administrations of two different chairman of the Board of Governors 
was tested by Havrilesky, Sapp and Schweitzer (1975). The period 
under review was 1964:1 -  1974:2. Using monthly data separate 
reaction functions were also estimated for various subperiods of 
'easy' and 'tig h t' money policies (see footnote d to Table 1). The 
period covered the presidential administrations of Johnson (January 
1964-December 1968) and Nixon (January 1969-December 1974), and the 
chairmanship of William McChesney Martin (1964:1 -  1970:1) and Arthur 
Burns (1970:1 -  1974:2). Empirical evidence confirmed the belie f that 
the Federal Reserve responded differently  to the 'state of econony' 
( i .e .  to a movement in target variables) under the regimes of the two
chairmen. The Federal Reserve responded more vigorously to price 
inflation during the chairmanship of Martin. Evidence also led to the 
conclusion that under the Nixon presidency the desired rate of 
unemployment rose to the 6 percent level during the 1972-74 period 
from the 4 percent level during the Johnson presidency.
The fiscal policy-money supply relationship has been discussed by 
Barro (1978) and Hamburger-Zwick (1981, H-Z hereafter) in two important 
papers. Barro refuted the budget deficit-money supply linkage and took 
the position that i t  is the departure of federal expenditure from 
normal, and not the absolute level of federal spending, that induces 
major changes in money growth. Empirical results also suggested 
counter-cyclical reactions of monetary authorities to the unemployment 
rate. In these equations the government expenditure variable (FEDV) 
is measured as the difference between the log of real federal 
expenditure and the log of 'normal' real federal expenditure—where 
the 'normal' real federal expenditure variable is a distributed 
(exponentially declining) lag of the log of current and real previous 
expenditures. The budget surplus variable [nominal federal surplus/ 
real trend GNP x im plicit price deflator (IPD)] was rendered 
insignificant in the presence of the federal expenditure variable 
(FEDV).
H-Z used two distinct measures of government expenditures. In 
addition to the variable employed by Barro (FEDV), they used another 
expenditure variable (FED)— nominal government expenditures divided by 
the GNP deflator multiplied by trend real GNP. When FED was 
substituted for FEDV, Barro's results did not change substantially. 
Together with this expenditure variable a d e fic it measure (DEF) was
employed, where DEF is the nominal Federal d e fic it (national income 
accounts) divided by the GNP deflator multiplied by trend real GNP.
When H-Z reestimated the equation over 1961-1974, they found a 
dramatic reversal of Barro's results. The federal expenditure 
variable was found insignificant in the presence of the d efic it 
variable. The unemployment variable turned insignificant too. 
Although government expenditure, rather than defic its , explained 
monetary growth over Barro's sample (1954-76), for a smaller sample 
period (1961-76), growth in the money supply was explained by federal 
deficits rather than by federal expenditures. This change in 
relationship was attributed to the higher emphasis the Fed placed on 
Keynesian policies beginning in the early 1960's. I t  led H-Z to 
conclude that Barro's expenditure variable was not an appropriate 
measure of the fiscal policy variable in the post -  1960 period, since 
during this period a noticeable change in the government's attitude  
took place. Keynesian policies were pursued more vigorously in this 
period, making deficits exert a stronger influence on money growth. 
But a re-estimation of the equation by McMi11 in-Beard (1982) made 
these results suspect. When revised data on GNP, federal expenditures 
and federal deficits were used for the period 1961-1974, neither 
Barro's nor H-Z's results were strongly supported.
Moore (1979) concluded that movement in the wage rate is the most 
significant variable in explaining the movement in the monetary base. 
Regressions were run on monthly and quarterly data. Different variable 
specifications included levels, f ir s t  differences and percentage 
changes. In addition to the wage rate variable, the price variable and 
foreign exchange variable explained variations in the monetary base.
The coefficient on the unemployment variable had a negative sign 
suggesting procyclical adjustments in monetary policy. One puzzling 
result of the study was the negative sign on the coefficient of a 
contemporaneous short-term interest rate variable (though i t  was 
significant only for the quarterly data). A negative coefficient on 
this variable would suggest that the Fed operates monetary policy so 
as to reinforce the fluctuations in the short-term interest rate. 
This result is a ll the more disturbing since he took the position that 
the primary and overriding objective of the Federal Open Market
Committee (FOMC) is to maintain the s tab ility  of the financial system. 
He did not make i t  clear as to why the Fed should strive to maintain 
financial market s tab ility  to the exclusion of price s tab ility  or the
income-employment objective. No fiscal variable was introduced as an
explanatory variable. Because of these weaknesses, the results of his 
study remain suspect.
McMi11 in-Beard (1980, M-B hereafter) estimated a reaction 
function as a part of a structural model for the econonjy. The Federal 
Reserve is perceived as being concerned with macro-economic
stabilization and financial market s tab ility  objectives. The reaction 
function is derived by minimizing a quadratic loss function subject to 
the structure of the economy. The loss function is comprised of the 
squared deviations of actual from desired values of output, prices, 
balance of payments and interest rate. The resulting reaction 
function relates a monetary policy variable (unborrowed reserves) to 
lagged exogenous and endogenous variables and desired values of the 
variables in the loss function. A system of simultaneous equations 
representing the structure of the economy (IS-LM type econometric
model) was solved for the reduced form money equation. The reaction 
function was estimated by regressing unborrowed reserves (adjusted for 
reserve requirement changes) on lagged nominal GNP (a pfoxy variable 
for several lagged endogenous and exogenous variables), nominal 
current government expenditures on goods and services, current 
exogeneous nominal federal net tax receipts, and desired values for 
real income, the inflation rate and the short-term interest rate. In 
addition to these variables, several dummy variables were used in the 
equation. Interaction dummy variables corresponding to different 
presidential administrations were included to test for any shifts in 
Federal Reserve behavior. For example, one interaction dummy 
variable, IDRYH, was given actual values of real high-employment 
output for the Kennedy-Johnson administration (1961:1 -  1968:4) and 
zero otherwise. In this fashion another interaction variable was 
constructed for the Nixon-Ford administration. Any change in Federal 
Reserve behavior during wage and price control periods was tested by 
including a wage and price freeze dummy variable and a post-freeze 
wage and price control dummy variable.
In the estimated equation, significant coefficients on the fiscal 
variables (a positive coefficient for government expenditure and a 
negative coefficient for government taxes) confirm the accormiodating 
nature of monetary policy followed by the Federal Reserve. The 
interest rate coefficient was significant with the expected (negative) 
sign, supporting the hypothesis that the Federal Reserve manipulates 
the monetary policy so as to minimize the fluctuations in the short- 
run interest rate. The procyclical policy response of the Federal 
Reserve is suggested by the positive sign on the national
income (proxy for aggregate demand) variable. The real high 
employment GNP variable was significant with the expected positive 
sign.
Abrams, Froyen and Waud (1980) estimated a monetary policy 
reaction function for the period 1970-77, using monthly data. The 
reaction function related a monetary policy variable (federal funds 
rate) to the consistent forecast of the deviation of the unemployment 
rate from the desired level, the rate of in fla tion , the surplus in the 
balance of the payments, the percentage effective devaluation in the 
foreign price of the do llar, the deviation in the money growth rate 
from the target growth rate, and the lagged federal funds rate. While 
Levy (1981) found no evidence of cyclical policy reactions, Abrams et 
a l . found strong evidence of pro-cyclical measures taken by the 
Federal Reserve. The unemployment coefficient was significant in each 
specification of the reaction function with a negative sign. Mixed 
evidence was found on the response to the inflation variable. This 
variable is significant fo r the simplest reaction function estimated, 
in which the monetary aggregate and exchange rate variables were 
omitted. The monetary authorities also responded systematically to 
the exchange rate target and an average of past deviations of the 
growth rate in Mj from the Fed's target rate. The Fed also tried to 
maintain short-term interest s tab ility  as is evident from the 
significant coefficient on the lagged federal funds rate. The 
s tab ility  of the reaction function was established by employing the 
random-coefficient regression technique.
Levy (1981) developed and estimated a Federal Reserve reaction 
function within the context of the IS-LM framework. On the basis of
the estimated reaction function, he found evidence of a positive link 
between government deficits and the monetary base. In the estimated 
reaction function, the monetary base, adjusted for changes in the 
reserve requirement ra tio , is expressed as a function of potential 
GNP, the lagged monetary base, short-term interest rate, inflationary 
expectations, publicly held debt, the unemployment rate, a time trend 
and seasonal dummy variables. This specification of the reaction 
function lacks the theoretical rigor of the M-B reaction function 
(1980). The reaction function was estimated in the f ir s t  difference 
form (to avoid the problems of serial correlation) using quarterly data 
for the period 1952:1 to 1978:4. The estimated coefficient of the 
publicly held debt variable was s ta tis tica lly  significant in explaining 
monetary base expansion, confirming the hypothesis of a positive money 
supply-budget d e fic it linkage. The unemployment variable was rendered 
insignificant in the presence of the government debt variable. The 
monetary authorities also reacted to changes in inflationary 
expectations. An increase in inflationary expectations led to an
expansion in the monetary base suggesting that the monetary 
authorities accommodated expected inflation by expanding the monetary 
base. No significant response of the monetary authorities to 
variations in the interest rate, the unemployment rate and potential 
GNP was detected. The estimated reaction function was found to be
unstable over the sample period on the basis of the Chow test. The 
change in the functional relationship over the sample period was 
attributed to the change in the Federal Reserve administration due to
the appointment of a new Federal Reserve chairman.
Barth, Sickles, and Wiest (1982) tested the hypothesis that the
Federal Reserve's response (measured by the monthly percentage changes 
in the monetary base) w ill vary with the degree of change in economic 
conditions (unemployment and in fla tio n ). A general spline estimator 
was developed to test for the different marginal responses of the 
central bank to changes in inflation and the unemployment rate, 
depending on the in it ia l level of these objective variables. 
Empirical evidence supported the hypothesis that the marginal response 
of the Federal Reserve does indeed vary according to the variab ility  
of economic conditions. A positive reaction of the Federal Reserve to 
changes in the unemployment rate and a negative reaction of the 
Federal Reserve to changes in the inflation rate was established. In 
addition, the Federal Reserve reacted positively to a change in the 
level of economic activ ity  (total sales) and negatively to a change in 
the fu ll employment budget surplus.
The question of a monetary policy sh ift over the period 1954-1980 
has also been addressed by Allen and Smith (1983, A-S hereafter). The 
hypothesis of a structural sh ift in the monetary policy regime between 
1959:1- 1961:4 is accepted on the basis of the Quandt and Chow test, 
thus lending support to the H-Z hypothesis. The de fic it variable 
(DEBT) used by A-S is the change in net federal debt divided by the 
im plicit price deflator times the trend value of real GNP 
[ANFD/Pt »Yt * ] .  They estimated the H-Z model substituting DEBT for DEF 
and using growth in the monetary base as the dependent variable. 
Quarterly data were used to estimate the equations. The entire sample 
period (1954:1 -  1980:4) was subdivided into several subperiods to 
test for a structural sh ift in monetary policy as suggested by H-Z and 
separate equations were estimated. (See footnote b accompanying Table
1.)  Three different policy regimes were identified. The debt 
variable was positive and significant in the f ir s t  two policy regimes, 
namely 1954:1 -  1961:2 and 1961:3 -  1969:3, while the expenditure 
variable (nominal government expenditure/implicit price deflator x 
trend real GNP) was positive and significant for the 1969:4 -  1980:4 
period. Evidence suggests structural shifts in the money supply 
function during 1961:2 -  1961:3 and .during 1969:3 - 1969:4.
The politico-economic theory of monetary expansion has been 
tested by Laney and W ille tt (1983) for the United States. According 
to this theory the incumbent party in any country would follow 
expansionary policies shortly before an election to create conditions 
of economic boom. After examining the data for 1960-76 they reached 
the conclusion that the Federal Reserve did not indulge in 'partisan 
p o litic s ', since no direct link could be established between the 
election cycle and money-supply behavior. Empirical evidence 
indicated that the Federal Reserve reacted in a pro-cyclical manner to 
the level of economic activ ity  and in a counter-cyclical manner to the 
output gap. The Federal Reserve was also sensitive to the general 
price level, wage rate and fu ll employment government d e fic it. An 
increase in the full-employment budget d e fic it exerted a positive 
significant influence on the money supply.
B. International Studies *
Turning our attention to the comparative international evidence, 
a summary l is t  of some previous comparative international reaction 
function studies is reported in Table 2. These studies are presented 
in chronological order. The signs on different coefficients represent 
the overall results of the study. Since these are comparative
Table 2. Summary L is t o f Honey Supply Reactlon-Functlon Studies: 
Comparative International Studies.
No. Study Sample9
Period
Regressand Form Lagged W U D FA IR IP Q/Q P Y 
Regressand______________________________________
1 Gordon (1977)
W illett-Laney
(1978)
1958:1-1973:1; & 
1958:1-1976:4;Q
1956-1976;A
Dombusch-Fischer
(1981) 1960-1977;A
Honey 
Supply 
(H I,M2)
HI
H1.H21
Growth Rate
F irs t Difference
Growth Rate -
09
+
+k +
+h 0
Willms (1983) 1973:1-1982:2;Q
1962:2-1982:2;Q
Central Growth Rate 
Bank Honey
Three-month Growth Rate
Honey Harket
Rate
0
0 - 0
See notes and defin ition  o f variables on pp. 26-28.
Notes:
Ml refers to the narrow money supply defined as C+D.
M2 refers to a broader definition of the money supply measured as 
C+D+T, where C = Currency, D = Demand Deposits and T = Time 
Deposits in commercial banks.
+, - ,  and 0 denotes respectively a positive significant sign, a
negative significant sign and an insignificant sign on coefficients 
at the 5% level. 
aQ denotes Quarterly, and A denotes an annual time unit.
^Different equations were estimated for the sample period 1958:1 - 
1973:1 ( i .e . ,  for the fixed exchange rate period) and for 1958:1 - 
1976:4 (which also includes a period of the floating exchange rates) 
to test for the structural sh ift in the monetary policy formulation. 
Countries included in the sample were the United States, Canada, 
France, West Germany, Ita ly , Japan, Sweden and the United Kingdom. 
cMoney Supply is Ml for a ll the countries except for Canada and France, 
for which i t  is M2.
^Significant for West Germany and Japan with positive coefficient. 
eThis coefficient was significant for West Germany, Japan and the 
United Kingdom.
f This coefficient was significant with a positive sign for Ita ly  and 
the United Kingdom but significant with a negative sign for Japan, 
Sweden and France.
^The budget d efic it variable is significant (with a positive sign) only 
in those equations in which the wage rate variable was omitted. When
both the wage rate and budget d e fic it variables were included 
simultaneously in the equation, the budget de fic it variable was 
rendered insignificant.
^Significant for Ita ly  but insignificant for the United Kingdom.
7M1 was used for South Africa and Israel, while Mg was used for other 
countries in the sample -  Finland, Guatemala, Ireland, Norway and Sri 
Lanka.
^This coefficient is significant with a positive sign for five out of 
seven countries, insignificant for Guatemala and significant with a 
negative sign for Norway.
k
Mixed evidence was encountered on this variable. Positive money 
supply-budget d e fic it linkage was confirmed only for Guatemala,
Israe l, and Norway.
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Definition of Variables:
W = Wage rate;
U = Unemployment rate;
D = Budget D eficit (Different specifications include budget 
d efic it as a ratio  of high powered money, nominal budget 
d e fic it, and a proxy variable for the fu ll employment 
d e fic it);
FA = Change in net foreign assets as a ratio of high powered money;
IR = International Reserves;
IP = Excess of import over domestic price increases;
Q/Q* = Output ratio , i .  e ., ratio of actual output (Q) to potential 
output (Q };
P = Price variable (Different specifications include tradable 
goods prices and the general price level);
Y = Real GNP.
international studies, there is no reason for the money supply process 
to be the same in a ll the countries. Signs in the table relate to the 
general conclusions of the study under review.
In a detailed study undertaken by Gordon (1977), an attempt was 
made to identify the source of inflation in eight industrialized 
countries (the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan, France, 
Ita ly , West Germany, Canada and Sweden) for the sample period of 
1958:3 -  1976:4. He tested the relative strength of the variables 
that may cause acceleration in the money supply. These variables 
included the wage rate variable, the output ratio variable, the 
traded-goods price index, the fiscal de fic it variable, international 
reserves, and wage dummy variables. He estimated separate equations 
of money growth, price growth and wage growth. On the basis of the 
empirical results he concluded that while no simple sub-hypothesis can 
precisely explain the behavior of money and prices in a ll the eight 
countries, the international monetarist hypothesis outscores the 
wage-push hypothesis. The wage-push hypothesis can explain the 
movements in wages but is not robust enough as a theory of inflation  
and monetary growth.
The international monetarist approach 1s a complex hypothesis 
that attributed the high rates of monetary growth outside the U.S. (in 
the late 60's) to developments in the U.S. that led to a high rate of 
growth of the money supply and prices in this country. This led to 
the acceleration in the money supply (and thus the prices) in other 
countries through four major transmission mechanisms. F irs t, the 
commodity arbitrage mechanism led to the higher prices of tradable
goods in other countries.^ Second, a trade surplus would lead to 
higher aggregate demand in the economy, higher prices and growth in 
the money supply. Third, expansion in the money supply in 'other' 
countries would also result due to an increase in 'international 
reserves'. Last, inflation in the U.S. led to inflationary 
expectations in other countries resulting in a high wage rate and 
price level. Thus, a positive sign on the international reserves 
variable, traded goods prices variable, domestic output variable and 
the wage rate variable would confirm the international monetarists 
hypothesis. In view of this hypothesis, inflation is viewed as an 
international monetary phenomenon.
Mixed results were reported for the budget deficit-money supply 
linkage. A significant positive relationship between budget d e fic it 
and money supply was suggested by the estimated reaction functions for 
Japan and West Germany. The sum of coefficients and the budget 
defic it variable was s ta tis tic a lly  insignificant for a ll other 
countries under review. Though one or more individual significant 
coefficients were reported for the U.K. and U.S. (with negative sign) 
and for France (with postiive sign).
Dornbusch-Fischer (1981) examined the budget deficits and 
monetary expansion link for seven different countries for the period 
1960-1977. Since they focused attention on less developed economies, 
countries were chosen on the basis of data ava ilab ility . These 
countries (Finland, Guatemala, Ireland, Israel, South Africa, Sri
^According to this mechanism, under the fixed exchange rate, prices of 
tradable goods in any country are fa ir ly  close to the world price level 
of tradable goods. These price increases in the tradable goods sector 
spread to nontradable goods, given the mobility of labor.
Lanka and Norway) cover a wide range of inflation rates (3.3 to 13.6), 
money growth rates (7.3 to 10.8) and budget deficits as a ratio of GNP 
(0.4 to 13.2). For each country, using annual time series data, they 
estimated a linear relationship in which the growth in the money 
supply is explained in terms of lagged growth rates of money, growth 
rates of nominal wages, unemployment rates, budget deficits (as a 
ratio to high powered money) and changes in net foreign assets (also a 
ratio to high powered money). The general f i t  of the equations was 
poor, which was attributed to a small number of observations. 
Estimated equations also suffered from serial correlation of 
residuals.
For five out of seven countries, the rate of change of wages has 
a positive and significant coefficient leading them to say " .. .th is  is 
evidence of monetary policy that accomodates wage pressures."5 But a 
significant positive coefficient of wages can not be .interpreted as 
accommodative monetary policy unless the exogeneity of wages is 
established, since monetarists argue that the rates of nominal wage 
increases reflect the past movement in the nominal money stock, just 
like  the general rate of in fla tion . No significant evidence was found 
of a counter cyclical policy that would counteract increased unemploy­
ment by an increased money supply, since the coefficient on this 
variable was either insignificant (Is rae l, South Africa) or 
significant with a negative sign. Mixed evidence was found on the 
budget deficit-money supply relationship. For Guatemala, Israel and 
Norway a significantly positive budget deficit-money supply
5Dornbusch and Fischer (1981), p. 333.
relationship was established while for other countries in the sample 
no such evidence was found.
Cost push factors as well as budget deficits were found to be 
major contributors to high rates of monetary expansion in the U.K. and 
Ita ly  by W illet and Laney (1978). They also presented graphs 
establishing positive correlations among budget d e fic its , monetary 
expansion and wage increases. But none of the relationships is tight 
enough to draw conclusive inferences. I t  appears that their  
statis tica l analysis is not rigorous enough so as to enable them to 
make conclusive remarks on causal relationships they are trying to 
establish. For Britain the correlation coefficent between government 
deficits (D) and the index of manufacturing hourly wage rates (W) is
0.90. This high correlation coefficient contributed to the poor 
performance of the d e fic it variable when both wage and d e fic it  
variables were included as independent variables. The import price 
variable was insignificant for both the economies, implying that 
monetary expansion in both countries took place in response to 
domestic pressures. However, the money supply in Ita ly  accommodated 
the changes in international reserves, as is evident from a 
significant (positive) coefficient on international reserves.
A reaction function for the Bundesbank was estimated as part of a 
study undertaken by Willms (1983). In the estimated reaction function
C
perceived monetary policy instruments were regressed on the inflation
6Central bank money (monetary base) was used as the monetary policy 
Instrument for 1973:1 -  1983:2, while the three-month money market 
rate was selected as the appropriate dependent variable over an 
extended sample period (1962:2 -  1982:2). The monetary base has been 
the announced Intermediate target variable since the early 1970's, 
while short-term interest rates were the intermediate target variable 
in the earlie r period.
rate, the growth rate of real GNP and the unemployment rate. Evidence 
indicates that the Bundesbank has primarily geared its  monetary policy 
to attain the objective of a low inflation rate over the entire sample 
period (1962:2 - 1982:2). The Bundesbank was not sensitive to changes 
in the unemployment rate. While some evidence of countercyclical 
policy was found over the period 1973:1 -  1982:2, no such evidence was 
detected for the extended sample period.
I I I .  General Results of the Studies
To sum up, i t  can be said that existing evidence relating to the 
reaction function of monetary authorities in different countries is 
mixed. For the United States the empirical evidence supports the 
monetarist contention. Most of the studies have reported a positive 
linkage between the money supply and a fiscal policy variable. 
Different studies have focused on different fiscal policy variables, 
e .g ., actual deficits [H-Z (1981) M-B (1982)], government expenditure 
and/or above normal government expenditure [Barro (1978), H-Z (1981), 
A-S (1983), M-B (1982)], fu ll employment budget surplus or defic it 
[Barth et ah (1982), Laney et ah (1983)], government expenditure and 
taxes [M-B (1980)], and government debt [Wood (1967), Levy (1981), A-S 
(1983)]. However, some scholars have found either no budget 
deficit-money supply linkage (McMi11 in-Beard, 1982) or a negative 
budget deficit-money supply linkage (Gordon, 1977).
Some support for the wage-push hypothesis has also been found. 
The wage-push theory of monetary accommodation was supported by Moore 
(1979) and Laney-Wlllett (1983).
Counter cyclical policy reactions were noticed by D-W (1963),
Havrilesky (1967), Barro (1978), H-Z (1981), McMi11 in-Beard (1980), 
Barth et aK (1982) and Abrams et al_. (1978). All these studies 
established empirical evidence indicating that the Federal Reserve 
adjusted the monetary base postively to an increase in the unemploy­
ment rate. Studies undertaken by M-B (1980) and Abrams et al_. (1980) 
lend credence to the hypothesis that the Federal Reserve is concerned 
with the financial s tab ility  objective. Generally, the monetary 
authorities seem to have accommodated the demand for increased 
economic activ ity  in the economy. Regression results gave the least 
support to the belief that the external balance goal has been a
systematic determinant of monetary policy. Evidence on the price 
stab ility  objective is ambiguous.
Turning to the evidence on foreign countries, i t  would be 
appropriate to say that no single hypothesis can explain the behavior 
of monetary authorities in different countries. Many studies failed  
to support the money supply-fiscal policy linkage. W-L (1978)
supported the wage-push hypothesis for the United Kingdom and Ita ly . 
Willms (1983) concluded that West Germany's Bundesbank conducts its  
monetary policy with the primary objective of maintaining a lower 
inflation rate. I t  seems that the central banks in countries other 
than the United States have responded to the external balance 
objective. No uniform pattern has been established with respect to 
cyclical policies.
Scanty empirical evidence is available on the estimation of the
money supply reaction function for the U.K., West Germany, and Canada.
Few attempts have been made to estimate and compare the monetary policy 
reaction function for these countries. Out of the four studies
reported in Table 2, only one study (Willms) has considered the 
monetary base as the monetary policy variable and that study does not 
include a budget d e fic it variable. The purpose of the present study 
is to contribute to and to improve upon the existing literature on the 
estimation of the monetary policy reaction function for the U.K., West 
Germany, and Canada.
The basic model underlying the time series estimation of the 
reaction function is presented in the next chapter.
CHAPTER I I I
THE MODEL
The aim of this paper is to formulate and estimate the monetary 
authorities' reaction function, i . e . ,  the systematic change in the 
behavior of the monetary authorities as exhibited through the change 
in some monetary policy variable in response to the changes in macro- 
economic and other variables. In this chapter the theoretical model 
is presented and the variables to be used in this study are specified.
In the next chapter this model w ill be applied to test the actual
behavior of the monetary authorities in the United Kingdom, West 
Germany, and Canada.
I .  Theoretical Model
As seen in the last chapter, most previous studies have used
either an explic it constrained optimization model or a reduced form 
approach. The reaction function in these studies is specified as a 
linear function of variables which are deemed theoretically or
historically plausible determinants of monetary policy.
A. Formal Constrained Optimization
The formal constrained optimization approach was taken only in a
^ee Wood (1967), Friedlaender (1973), Havrilesky, Sapp and Schweitzer 
(1975), and McMillin and Beard (1980).
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small proportion of the studies.* The theoretical model of the 
monetary authorities' behavior was f ir s t  developed by Wood (1967). 
Under this approach, the reaction function of the monetary authorities 
is exp lic itly  derived with a constrained optimization procedure. The 
monetary authorities are perceived as trying to minimize a static  
quadratic loss function (or maximize a u t i l i ty  function). This is the 
weighted sum of squared deviations of actual from desired values of 
economic variables to which authorities respond. The u t i l i ty  or the 
loss function represents the authorities' preferences among altern­
ative states of the economy, characterized by a small set of variables. 
This loss function is minimized subject to the constraints which are 
reduced form equations embodying the perceived economic structure.
The implied reaction function usually takes the form of a linear 
function in which the monetary policy control variable is estimated as 
a linear function of the goal variables measured as deviations from 
their optimal levels as well as exogenous variables which are included 
in the structural constraint equations. The coefficients of the 
reaction function are complex combinations of u t i l i ty  function weights 
and structural equations parameters. Therefore, no inferences can be 
drawn from these coefficients about the policymakers' preferences.
B. Reduced Form Reaction Function
The other, and more commonly used, approach is the reduced form 
2
approach, in which no exp lic it optimization procedure is carried out. 
The monetary policy control variable is estimated as a linear function
p
For example see Dewald and Johnson (1963); Havrilesky (1967); Moore 
(1979); Barth, Sickles and Wiest (1982); and W ille tt and Laney (1978).
of variables which are like ly  determinants either in view of the past 
history of policymaking or are implied by economic theory. Most 
studies include macro-stabilization goals (e .g ., low in fla tion , high 
employment, a growth objective, and a balance of payments objective) 
and a financial s tab ility  objective. The coefficients of the reaction 
function provide no direct information on the policymakers* u t i l i ty  
function or on the weights assigned to different objectives in the 
u t i l i ty  function. I t  remains uncertain whether the policymakers are 
more concerned about in flation  or employment or some other objective. 
The reaction function coefficients im plicitly  represent nonlinear 
combinations of loss function weights and structural parameters and 
cannot be used to draw any inferences about the monetary authority's 
preferences. The reaction function coefficients show how policymakers 
responded to changes in the goal variables.
I I .  Specification of the Model
The proposed form of the general model for central bank behavior 
is as follows:
M6t  = f  A^rt - i *  DEFt - i *  ^ t - i*  ^t-1* ^ t -1 *  AEEXRt- i»  ATBt-i»  0Gt-i^
(3.1)
where:
Mfi = Quarterly rate of change of monetary base,
Ar = Quarterly changes in interest rate,
DEF = Budget d e fic it variable,
Cl = Quarterly rate of change in wages,
f* = Quarterly rate of change in prices,
ift = Quarterly rate of change in international reserves,
AEEXR = Quarterly changes in effective exchange rate,
ATB = Quarterly changes in trade balance,
OG = Output gap,
subscript t  refers to the time period under consideration, and 
subscript i indicates the lag length. Both the contemporaneous and 
lagged (when applicable) values of the explanatory variables are 
employed.
The money supply reaction function specified here represents the 
reduced form reaction function, im plic itly  derived from a larger 
structural model. As noted before the estimated coefficients of the 
reduced form reaction function do not provide direct information on the 
priorities  of the monetary authorities. However, the estimated 
coefficients help in ascertaining determinants of the money supply in 
countries operating under different monetary and po litica l regimes.
The form in which variables enter the equation and the expected sign 
on the coefficients are discussed below.
The monetary base has been chosen as the monetary policy variable 
since i t  serves as a more appropriate dependent variable than the 
money supply (defined narrowly or broadly). Changes 1n the money 
supply can take place without accommodative reactions from central 
banking authorities to an increase in the sale of government 
securities to finance a budget d e fic it or to the other variables to 
the extent that these variables also a lte r economic variables that in 
turn lead to changes in the money supply. The d e fic it w ill lead to 
higher short-term interest rates, which can induce an Increase in the 
supply of money through changes in private sector responses.
Therefore, even in the face of nonaccommodative policies by the 
central bank, the money supply may increase because of a reduction in 
the ratio of excess reserves/demand deposits and time deposits/demand 
deposits. Thus, the regression coefficient of budget deficits on the 
money supply w ill incorporate the influence of these private sector 
responses as well as central bank responses. To isolate the central 
bank responses, i f  any, to changes in budget deficits and other macro 
economic variables, the appropriate dependent variable is the monetary 
base rather than the money supply.
Moreover, in an international study, use of a standardized 
dependent variable is appropriate. Currently, different countries 
focus on different concepts of the money supply because of the 
different levels of development of financial markets and ava ilab ility  
of near-money substitutes. New innovations in financial markets bring 
forth new financial instruments which are close substitutes for 
trad itionally  defined money. For example, Negotiable Orders of 
Withdrawal (NOW) are a close substitute for checking and saving
Q
deposits. These near-monies should be included in a comprehensive
definition of the money supply. Thus, different levels of development 
of financial markets would warrant different definitions of the money 
supply.^ The monetary base, on the other hand, is applicable to 
different financial and institutional structures. The monetary base
3
In the U.S. NOW accounts are included in Ml.
^The Issue of defining money has not been settled even at the
theoretical level. There are some subtle issues in defining money,
and i t  is not clear that a ll near monies (like  passbook savings, 
unused credit fa c ilit ie s ) should be included in a ll definitions of 
money.
has been used as a dependent variable in studies undertaken by Barth, 
Sickles and Wiest (1982), Froyen (1974), Levy (1981), and others. The 
quarterly rate of growth of the monetary base [Log (MBt /MBt _ j) ]  is the 
dependent variable used in the estimated reaction functions in this 
study.
The interest rate variable used in estimation is the quarterly 
change in the three-month Treasury b ill  rate (TBRt  -  TBRt _ j) . A 
positive coefficient is expected on the interest rate variable 
stressing the interest rate s tab ility  concern of the monetary 
authorities. The monetary authorities would like to stabilize the 
interest rates at low levels, so that an increase in the interest rate 
may induce the monetary authorities to pursue expansionary monetary 
policies aimed at bringing interest rates down. A short-term interest 
rate measure is favored as opposed to a long-term interest rate 
because i t  appears more like ly  that central banks would monitor the 
fluctuations in short-term rates.®
The fiscal policy variable, the government d e fic it (or surplus), 
has been used in different forms in different studies. W ille tt and 
Laney (1978) used the actual government de fic it while the ratio of the 
budget de fic it to high powered money was used in the money growth 
function estimated by Dornbusch and Fischer (1981). Gordon (1977) 
used the fis c a l-d e fic it residual variable in the money growth 
equation. To obtain this residual variable, the fis c a l-d e fic it ratio
®4s Levy (1981) points out, "The 3-month treasury-bill rate rather 
than a long run interest rate is used because i t  is a better indicator 
of the cost of government borrowing (a growing portion of the debt is 
financed through short-term debt issues)" p. 357. I t  is not clear, 
however, whether this is true for the countries under study.
was constructed by dividing the nominal d e fic it of the central 
government by the nominal gross national product. This ratio was 
regressed on a constant, three seasonal dummies, and the real output 
ratio (current and lagged one period). The level of residuals from 
this equation was entered into the money equation.
In the present study we have experimented with alternative 
specifications of the government d e fic it variable. Alternative 
specifications of the budget de fic it variable include de-trended 
budget deficits and de-trended changes in government debt. To 
de-trend the budget d e fic it, the ratio of the actual real budget
d e fic it to the trend value of real GNP is taken. To construct a 
series for trend real GNP, real GNP is regressed on a constant and 
time variable (both linear and polynomial). The predicted GNP values 
from this equation are used as a measure of trend real GNP. The 
nominal budget d e fic it is then divided by the product of the GNP
deflator and the trend value of real GNP. An analogous measure of the 
fiscal policy variable has been used by Barro (1977, 1978), Hamburger 
and Zwick (1981), and Allen and Smith (1983). De-trended changes in 
government debt are computed by dividing the quarterly change in the 
nominal government debt by the product of the GNP deflator and the 
trend value of real GNP.
A positive coefficient on the budget d e fic it variable w ill 
confirm a positive budget deficit-money supply linkage. An increase 
in government expenditures (or the budget d e fic it) w ill push up the 
market interest rate, i f  the real money supply is held constant. The 
central bank, in an e ffo rt to dampen the interest rate, w ill increase
the money supply to offset part or a ll of the increase in the interest
rate. But this positive linkage may not be observed i f  the central 
bank's concern for other goals (e .g ., the price s tab ility  objective) 
is greater than its  concern for financial market s tab ility . An 
increase in government expenditure w ill result in a higher level of 
aggregate demand and a higher price level. The monetary authority may 
respond to the higher prices by adopting a restrictive monetary 
policy.
Following Gordon (1977), W ille tt and Laney (1978), and Dornbusch 
and Fischer (1977) the quarterly growth rate of nominal wages [log 
(Wt /Wt _ j)]  has been introduced in the money growth equation to test 
for the wage push hypothesis. Adherents of the wage-push hypothesis 
blame wage acceleration for monetary expansion. According to 
Dornbusch- Fischer (1981, pp. 330-331) " . . .  increased wage inflation  
requires an accommodating monetary expansion. There is a question 
whether monetary accommodation is fu ll or only partia l. In the former 
case increased wage inflation leads to higher inflation and no 
decrease in output, while in the la tte r  case the output effect is 
negative. This case is less like ly  in that the central bank w ill 
typically have both inflation and employment targets." Increases in 
wages, i f  not accommodated by monetary expansion, w ill put a squeeze 
on profits and lead to increased unemployment and reduced output. The 
response of monetary authorities to these economic variables may take 
the form of monetary expansion. A positive sign on the wage 
coefficient w ill confirm the direct money supply-wage increase 
linkage.
The inflation rate variable [log (Pt /Pt _^)3, the quarterly rate 
of change in the consumer price index, reflects the price s tab ility
objective of the central bank. The expected sign of the coefficient 
on the inflation variable is negative, since any inflationary pressure 
in the economy may be countered by contractionary monetary policies. 6 
The coefficient may be less than minus unity because monetary 
authorities are aware of the fact that contractionary policies may 
result in higher short-run unemployment.
The output gap, the output ra tio , and the unemployment variable 
are the alternative variables employed to test for the cyclical 
reactions of the monetary authority. The deviations between actual 
and trend GNP are used as a proxy for the output gap. To attain trend 
real GNP, real GNP is regressed on a constant and a trend variable,
i .e .  equations of the following form are estimated:
GNP = C + T + ul t  (3.2)
GNP = C + T + T2 + u2t (3.3)
Equations (3.2) and (3.3) test for the existence of a linear 
trend versus a polynomial trend. The equation giving the best f i t  is 
picked. Predicted GNP from the chosen equation is used as a proxy for 
the trend GNP. The output gap as a percentage of trend real GNP is 
calculated as follows:
Output Gap =  ^ Actual real GNP -  Trend real GNP j X 100 (3.4)
Trend real GNP
6Im plicit in the argument is the assumption that the desired inflation  
rate is zero.
I t  1s entered- in level form in the money growth equation. In 
addition, 'output ratio ' (Q/Q ) has also been used as a proxy for the 
effects of real output and labor market conditions in the money
•ff
equation (where Q is actual output and Q is potential real output). 
This measure was suggested and used by Gordon (1977) in the money 
growth equation. Alternatively, quarterly changes in the unemployment 
rate have been used as an explanatory variable to test the cyclical 
response of the monetary authority.
A positive sign on the domestic output coefficient would confirm 
the pro-cyclical reaction of the monetary authorities, since an 
increase in domestic output would lead to increased money demand and 
thus to an increased money supply. A negative sign on the output 
coefficient or a positive sign on unemployment variable would support 
a counter-cyclical reaction of the monetary authorities. A positive 
coefficient on the unemployment variable can be interpreted as the 
countercyclical reaction of the monetary authority, since an increase 
in unemployment (or a decrease in the level of economic activ ity ) is 
countered by an expansionary monetary policy.
The money supply process in any open economy is also influenced 
by the balance of payments situation. The balance of payments 
situation has a direct impact on the money stock under fixed exchange 
rates. The monetary base of the economy is equal to the sum of 
domestic credit and net foreign assets of the central bank. A balance 
of payments surplus would lead to an increase in the net foreign 
assets, thus expanding the monetary base, unless the changes in the 
foreign assets are sterilized by the monetary authorities through 
offsetting movements in domestic credit. To test for th is , the
quarterly change in international reserves (IRt  -  IRt _ j) and the 
quarterly rate of change of international reserves [log(IRt /IR t _^)] 
have been used as alternative explanatory variables, the expected sign 
of the coefficient being positive. However, the possibility of the 
absence of a positive sign on international reserves can not be ruled 
out. I f  the monetary authorities can successfully s te rilize  the 
movements in foreign assets by varying domestic credit, the 
coefficient on international reserves may be s ta tis tica lly  
insignificant.
To detect any changes in the behavior of the monetary authorities 
in the floating exchange rate period (1973 onwards), Gordon estimated 
two sets of money growth equations, one for the period 1958:3 to 1973:1 
(basic equation) and the other for the period 1958:3-1976:4 (auxiliary  
equation). The auxiliary equation includes an additional variable, the 
rate of change of the exchange rate between each country and the U.S. 
dollar. This variable is entered as a m ultiplicative dummy assuming a 
zero value through 1973:1 and positive values thereafter. A sh ift in 
the coefficients between the basic and auxiliary equations was 
attributed to the changed structure of the money supply process under 
the flex ib le  exchange rate period. Abrams, Froyen and Waud (1980) have 
used the balance of payments surplus in conjunction with effective 
dollar devaluation as explanatory variables.
In this study, in addition to an international reserve variable, 
quarterly changes in the index of bilateral exchange rate ( i .e . ,  the 
exchange rate between the currency in question and the U.S. dollar) and 
quarterly changes in the index of effective exchange rate are used as 
alternative specifications of the exchange rate variable. The la tte r
is an index combining the exchange rates between the currency in 
question and other major currencies.^ The index of the effective 
exchange rate is given values equal to zero for the fixed exchange 
rate period and equal to its e lf  for the floating exchange rate period 
(since this measure is available only for the floating exchange rate 
period). Finally, two other international variables are tested— 
quarterly changes in the current account of the balance of payments 
and the quarterly changes in the net trade account of the balance of 
payments. The expected sign on these variables is positive, since an 
increase in the balance of payments surplus may cause an expansion in 
the monetary base.
I I I .  Method of Econometric Estimation
The general practice in the studies summarized in Chapter I I  is
Q
to use the same lag length on a ll the explanatory variables. Since 
there is no a-priori reason to impose the same lag length on a ll the 
explanatory variables, the Final Prediction Error (FPE) test [Hsiao, 
1981] has been used to determine the lag length on each explanatory 
variable separately. The use of this procedure allows the data to 
determine the lag length.
Hsiao (1981) suggests a step-wise, procedure to determine the lag 
length on different exogeneous variables in a multivariate model.
^Other currencies are assigned weights which in turn are derived from 
the Multilateral Exchange Rate Model (MERM) developed by the IMF. 
This model assigns weights 1n accordance to the size of flows as well 
as of the relevant price e lastic ities  and the feedback effects of 
exchange rate changes on domestic costs and prices.
Q
Gordon (1977) used three lagged dependent and independent variables in 
the money equation.
This procedure is based on Granger's concept of causality and Akiake's 
final prediction error (FPE) criterion. Using this step-wise 
procedure, a different lag length can be determined for each of the 
right hand side variables of a multivariate equation.
Since the lag length on each variable is determined by the data, 
the FPE procedure avoids any bias due to underspecification of lags on 
a variable(s) when a common lag length is employed. According to 
Caines et aj_. (1981, p. 269) "The minimum FPE criterion is equivalent 
to applying an approximate F-test with varying significance levels". 
To specify the order in which the right hand side variables enter the 
equation, the Specific Gravity Criterion of Caines, Keng and Sethi
g
(1981) is used. Details of the estimation procedure are given below.
1. In the f ir s t  step, the optimum lag length is determined on 
each of the explanatory variables (one at a time). For this purpose 
biva'riate equations of the following form are estimated:
M6+ = C + £ a . Xt  .  + e+ t  n t-n t (3.5)
n=0
where:
C = constant,
X = independent variables (taken one at a time),
MB = monetary base,
g
Akiake's final prediction error test in conjunction with Caines' et 
a l. (1981) specific gravity test is used by McMillin (1985) to examine 
■the budget deficit-money supply linkage in a multivariable equation.
N = highest order lag, 
subscript t  stands for time, and 
e = error term.
The order of the lag is varied in each bivariate equation. For each 
bivariate equation the FPE is calculated using the following formula:
FPE, ' = T + n + 1 . SSR(n) (3.6)
T -  n -  1 T •
where T is the number of observations actually used in estimating the 
bivariate equation, n stands for the order of the lag and SSR denotes 
sum of squared residuals. The lag length that yields the minimum FPE 
is then selected as the appropriate lag length. According to Hsiao 
(1981), the use of the minimum FPE criterion is analogous to the 
application of an F-test with varying significance levels. As noted 
by Judge et al_. (1982) and Hsiao (1981), the FPE criterion is 
in tu itive ly  appealing because an Increase in the number of lags w ill 
lead to an Increase in the f ir s t  term but would decrease SSR and thus 
the second term on the right hand side in equation (3 .6 ). The minimum 
FPE is recorded when these two opposing forces are balanced.
In this manner, using the bivariate equation models, a lag length 
yielding the minimum FPE is selected for each explanatory variable. A 
problem encountered here, however, is determining the order in which 
explanatory variables enter the equation. The specific gravity 
criterion of Caines, Keng and Sethi (1981) is used to ascertain which 
one of the explanatory variables should enter the money growth
equation f ir s t ,  with the chosen number of lags. The specific gravity 
of the causal variable X with respect to the caused variable MB is the 
reciprocal of the minimum final prediction error. Explanatory 
variables are ranked in the descending order of the specific gravity. 
Specific gravities of the causal variable with respect to the caused 
variable indicate the relative importance of the explanatory variables 
in explaining the movements in the endogenous (policy) variables.
2. In the second step, the causal variable with the highest 
specific gravity is chosen as the f ir s t  explanatory variable entering 
the equation with predetermined lag length. Then, this variable is 
treated as a controlled variable, with given lag length, and a 
trivaria te  equation of the following form is estimated:
I N
MB. = an + E a. Y. . + E a X+ + ef  (3.7)
t  0 i=o 1 t_1 n=0 n t -n  t
Here Y is the controlled variable, i . e . ,  the f ir s t  variable 
chosen to enter the equation on the basis of the specific gravity 
criterion described in step 1; I is the predetermined order of the lag 
on variable Y ( I . e . ,  the lag length yielding minimum FPE); N is the 
maximum number of quarters over which the appropriate lag length is 
searched for each variable; and X stands for other causal variables 
(taken one at a time). In the triva ria te  equations the lag length is 
varied on variable X and the appropriate lag length is selected on the 
basis of the FPE test. This procedure is repeated for every 
explanatory variable (other than the controlled variable Y) and then 
variables are ranked In order of decreasing specific gravity. The one 
with the highest specific gravity enters the equation in second place
with the lag length determined by minimum FPE.
3. In the third step, four-variable models are estimated, with 
two controlled variables (with predetermined lags) and other 
explanatory variables entering as manipulated variables, with varying 
lag length (considered one at a time). As described in steps one and 
two above, the appropriate lag length is chosen on each of the 
manipulated explanatory variables. Variables are ranked in descending 
order of specific gravity and the one with the highest specific 
gravity is added to the equation with appropriate lag length. The 
same procedure is repeated until a ll the explanatory variables are 
added to the equation with the specified lag length.
The search for the optimum lag length for each causal variable is 
carried out over the identical sample.period. The maximum number of 
lags tried for each variable is also the same. The FPE criterion  
would fa c ilita te  entering each variable with a different order of lag, 
a lag length that is determined by the information contained in the 
sample and is not imposed in an arbitrary manner. The use of the 
specific gravity criterion makes possible a d ifferent specification of 
the reaction function for the monetary authorities in different 
countries. Once the optimum lag length is determined on each 
explanatory variable, along with the order in which explanatory 
variables enter the equation, reaction functions are estimated using 
the OLS and the instrumental variables (IV) techniques. IV is adopted 
to avoid any inconsistent parameter estimates due to a possible 
feedback between the explained variable (monetary base) and the 
contemporaneous values of the explanatory variables (e .g ., Interest 
rate, price index, budget de fic it or wage rate ). The resulting 
coefficient estimates w ill be asymptotically consistent. I f
preliminary results suggest the presence of serial correlation among 
residuals, OLS and IV estimates are obtained using the Cochrane-Orcutt 
iterative procedure. Restricted versions of reaction functions are 
also estimated after dropping s ta tis tica lly  insignificant variables 
from the fu lly  specified reaction function.
The next step is to estimate econometrically the theoretical 
model presented in this chapter, using the FPE and the Specific 
Gravity c rite ria . Estimation results are reported in the next 
chapter.
CHAPTER IV
ESTIMATED REACTION FUNCTIONS
The general model underlying the time series estimation of the 
reaction function was developed in Chapter I I I .  As described there, 
the reaction function of the individual countries and the order of the 
lag on explanatory variables are specified with the help of a 
sequential procedure using Caines' et aK (1981) specific gravity 
criterion and Hsiao's (1981) FPE criterion. The estimation results 
for the United Kingdom, West Germany, and Canada are reported in this 
chapter. I t  consists of three sections. The f ir s t  section presents 
the estimated reaction function for the central bank in the United 
Kingdom. Estimated reaction functions for West Germany and Canada are 
discussed in sections I I  and I I I  respectively.
All the equations are estimated using quarterly data over the 
identical sample period (1960:2 -  1983:4).1 The starting date for the 
sample is determined by the starting date of the data f i le  (1957:1) 
and by the maximum number of quarters over which the appropriate lag 
length is searched (12 quarters). The maximum time period over which 
the lag length is searched is twelve quarters, since this time period 
is considered to be long enough to detect any response of the monetary 
authorities to changes in economic and other variables.
^Models have been estimated using the T.S.P. (Time Series Processor) 
package, Version 4.0.
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Reaction functions are estimated by regressing a monetary policy 
variable (quarterly rate of change in the monetary base) on 
explanatory variables representing different concerns of monetary 
authorities. For some explanatory variables, alternative 
specifications have been used in order to identify the most 
appropriate form of the explanatory variables. For example, the 
detrended budget surplus (SUR) variable and the detrended government 
debt (DEBT) variable are tried alternatively to test for a fiscal
p
policy-monetary policy linkage. The output ratio (OR), the output 
gap (OG) and the unemployment variable (AUN) test the monetary 
authorities' concern about cyclical fluctuations in the economy. The 
exchange rate variable, the international reserves variable, and the 
balance of payments variable are proxies employed for the external 
balance objective. Different specifications of the exchange rate 
variable include quarterly changes in the bilateral exchange rate 
(AEXR) (between the currency in question and the U.S. dollar) and 
quarterly changes in the effective exchange rate (AEEXR, defined on 
pp. 45-46). Two alternative specifications are used for the 
international reserves variable—quarterly changes in international 
reserves (AIR) and the quarterly rate of change of international 
reserves (IR ). Two alternative variables used to test the reaction of 
monetary authorities to changes in balance of payments are quarterly 
changes in the current account of the balance of payments (ABOPCB) and 
quarterly changes in the trade balance (ATB).
2
The government debt variable has not been used for the United Kingdom 
due to the lack of complete data f ile s .
Reaction functions are estimated using OLS and the instrumental 
variable (IV) technique. I f  preliminary results suggest the presence 
of serial correlation among residuals, OLS and IV equations are 
estimated using the Cochrane-Orcutt iterative procedure. In the case 
of IV estimation, with a serial correlation correction, the lagged 
dependent variable has been added to the l is t  of instrumental 
variables, since Fair (1970) has shown that the lagged dependent and 
independent variables must be included in this l is t  to ensure 
consistent estimates.
I .  United Kingdom
Tables 4-11 determine the basic form of the linear reaction 
function for the United Kingdom. Variables used in Table 4-13 are 
defined in Table 3. In addition to the other explanatory variables, a 
constant term and three seasonal dummies have been added to each 
equation. Table 4 reports the results of the equations having the 
following form:
MBt  = C ♦ «lDl ♦ c2D2 ♦ CjDj +j QBn Xt _n (4.1)
where D ,^ D2» and D3 denote three seasonal dummies, and X denotes 
other explanatory variables (taken one at a time). MB stands for the 
growth rate of the monetary base, subscripts t  and n refer to the time 
period under consideration and lag length respectively. N is the 
highest order of the lag considered (12 quarters). For each causal 
variable, separate equations are estimated with varying lag lengths. 
The lag length is varied from 0 to 12 (thus for every causal variable
thirteen equations are estimated). For every equation the FPE was 
computed. The minimum FPE for every, causal variable and the 
associated lag length (in quarters) is reported in Table 4. Variables 
are then ranked in descending order of specific gravity, where 
specific gravity is computed as 1/FPE. From these bivariate models, 
on the basis of the specific gravity criterion , the quarterly rate of 
growth of international reserves is chosen as the f ir s t  variable to 
enter the money growth equation, with lag length of one quarter. This 
variable would not have been preferred i f  the adjusted coefficient of 
determination (adjusted for degrees of freedom) was the sole criterion  
for determining the order in which the right hand side variables enter 
the regression equation. Results presented in Table 4 also suggest 
that for the international reserves variable, the quarterly rate of 
growth (ift) is a better specification than quarterly changes (AIR), 
since a lower value of the minimum FPE is recorded for the former.
In the next step, the international reserves variable (ift) is 
treated as a controlled variable with one quarter lag length (see Table 
5). All other causal variables are coupled with ift with varying lag 
lengths, i . e . ,  the linear equation in the following form is estimated:
MSt  = c + ajDj + ct2D2 + CI3D3 +k^oalk +=2 8n Xt _n (4.2)
where Dj, D2, D3 and I ft denote three seasonal dummies and the 
international reserves variable, and X denotes other explanatory 
variables (taken one at a time). The international reserves variable 
is treated as a controlled variable and enters every equation with a 
fixed lag length (determined in the previous step), while the lag
length on a ll the other causal (manipulated) variables is varied from 
0 to 12 quarters in different equations. In Table 5, the minimum FPE 
for different trivaria te  equations and corresponding lag lengths are 
reported. Causal variables are arranged in descending order of the 
specific gravity. On the basis of the specific gravity criterion, 
quarterly changes in the index of effective exchange rate enters the 
money growth function in the second place. For this variable the 
minimum FPE was recorded for a lag length of two quarters. Thus, the 
effective exchange rate variable is added to the equation with a lag 
length of two quarters.
The same procedure is repeated to determine the order of other 
causal variables in the money growth equation. The FPE and the 
specific gravity crite ria  are used in Tables 4-11 to determine the lag 
length on different explanatory variables, the proper specification of 
the variable, and the order in which the right hand side variables 
enter the money growth equation. From this stepwise procedure, the 
basic model of the following form is specified3*^:
M®t = C +i f 1“i Di +kfo3lk I t^_k \ > AEEXRt- k SURt"k +
a4 AUNt  +k=0a5k Art-k  £=q a6k “t-k  £=ga7k AB0PCBt -k + a8^t 
_________  (4.3)
3See Table 3 for definition of variables.
A^n alternative measure of the fiscal variable gave the same results. 
Following Gordon's (1977) procedure, the fiscal-surplus residual 
variable was constructed by regressing the fiscal-surplus ratio (i»e.» 
the ratio of the nominal actual surplus and nominal GNP) on a 
constant, three seasonal dummies and the current and lagged ratio of 
real GNP to trend real GNP. The level of residuals from this equation 
was entered into the money equation. The minimum FPE (.00146) 
occurred at the lag length of six quarters..
The model presented in equation (4.3) was f ir s t  estimated with 
OLS procedure. The D-W s ta tis tic  for this equation was 2.34. Due to 
the large number of regressors, the D-W bounds test could not be 
performed.® However, the possibility of the first-o rder negative 
correlation among residuals could not be ruled out. Thus, to check 
for serial correlation, the Box-Pierce Q s ta tis tic  was computed.® The
estimated value of the Q-statistic for this equation was 3.06 for the
2firs t-order serial correlation. The tabulated value of x at the 5% 
level of significance is .0039 (for 1 d .o .f . ). Since the calculated 
s ta tis tic  is higher than the tabulated value, null hypothesis of no 
first-order serial correlation was rejected at the 5 percent level. 
Since the presence of the autocorrelation results in ineffic ient OLS 
parameter estimates, the Cochrane-Orcutt iterative  procedure is used 
to correct for f ir s t  order serial correlation.
Table 12 presents the estimated reaction function of the monetary 
authorities of the United Kingdom for the sample period 1960:2 -  
1983:4. Equation (12.1) has the form of the basic model specified in
equation (4.3) on the basis of the final prediction error test and the
specific gravity criterion. OLS estimates in equation (12.1) are
obtained by the Cochrane-Orcutt (C-0) method. The D-W statis tic
indicates the absence of any further f ir s t  order serial correlation.
5
The available tables for the D-W bounds test are restricted to 21 
regressors (including the constant term). Since the number of 
regressors in this estimated equation (not reported) was 32, the D-W 
bounds test could not be performed.
®Q sta tis tic  was f ir s t  suggested by Box and Pierce (1970). I t  is 
approximately distributed as X (Chi-square) with K degrees of freedom 
where K refers to the number of autocorrelations.
The Q-statistic for the first-order serial correlation for equation
(12.1) is .00000055. Since the estimated value of the Q s ta tis tic  is 
lower than the tabulated value of (.0039), the null hypothesis
of no further first-order serial correlation [ i . e . ,  Ho: = p2 = . . .
p^  = 0] cannot be rejected. In equation (12.1) the sums of 
coefficients on the effective exchange rate variable (a2) and the 
unemployment variable (a^) are s ta tis tica lly  significant. While for 
other explanatory variables the sums of the coefficients were 
insignificant, some individual significant coefficients were observed. 
Since the estimated equation suggests that variations in the price 
level do not explain the permanent or the temporary adjustments in the 
behavior of the monetary authority, the reaction function was 
reestimated after dropping the price variable. I t  should be noted 
that the other explanatory variables with insignificant sum of the 
coefficients are retained in the estimated equation, because some 
significant individual coefficients were observed for these variables. 
The estimation results for this restricted model are reported in 
equation ( 12. 2).
When the price inflation variable is dropped, the estimated 
reaction function ( 12. 2) registers a sign reversal on the sum of 
coefficients, of the short-term interest rate variable ag, even though 
i t  is s ta tis tica lly  insignificant. The coefficient on the 
unemployment variable (a^) remains significant at the 5% level with a 
negative sign. A negative coefficient on the unemployment variable 
indicates the procyclical reactions of the monetary authority. For 
every percentage point increase in the unemployment rate, the growth 
rate of the monetary base decreased by .036% by the end of that
quarter (equation 12.2). The sum of coefficients on the effective  
exchange rate variable is signficant in both OLS equations [(12.1) and
(12.2)] at the 5% level of significance with a positive sign. The 
positive coefficient on the effective exchange rate variable indicates 
an expansionary effect of this variable on the Mfi. For every 
percentage point increase in the index of the effective exchange rate 
sustained over a period of three quarters, MB increased by .0009% by 
the end of the third quarter. The sums of coefficients on a ll other 
variables are s ta tis tic a lly  insignificant suggesting that these 
economic variables do not have any permanent influence on monetary 
policy after a ll the temporary adjustments have taken place.
To avoid any ineffic ien t parameter estimates due to endogeneity 
among contemporaneous values of the explanatory ; variables, the 
reaction function is reestimated using the instrumental variable 
technique with f ir s t  order serial correlation correction. Cochrane- 
Orcutt (C-0) iterative  procedure for serial correlation correction is 
combined with an instrumental variable procedure. A time trend 
variable, detrended government expenditures (current and three lagged 
values) and one additional lag on each explanatory variable were used 
as instrumental variables. In addition to these instrumental 
variables, the lagged dependent variable (M&t _ j) has been used as an 
instrument. A lagged dependent variable has been added to the l is t  of 
the instrumental variables, since Fair (1970) has shown that the 
inclusion of the lagged dependent and independent variables, in the 
instrument l is t ,  results in the consistent parameter estimates in the 
case of the IV estimation with a serial correlation correction. 
Results are reported in equation (12.3 and 12.4). Equation (12.3)
reports the results of the model specified in equation (4 .3 ), while 
equation (12.4) presents the estimated parameters of a restricted 
model in which the price variable, the balance of payments variable, 
and the wage rate variable have been dropped. A decision to drop 
these variables was made a fter analyzing their individual coefficients 
(contemporaneous and lagged). In addition to insignificant sums of 
coefficients, these variables exhibited a ll insignificant individual 
coefficients, suggesting that variations in these variables do not 
affect the behavior of the monetary authority in the U.K. 
systematically or temporarily.
With the use of the instrumental variable technique, t-s ta tis ties  
for the sum of coefficients on the unemployment variable registered a 
sharp decline (12.3) and (12.4). Significant changes in the results 
are observed with the use of the instrumental variable technique. A 
comparision of equations (12.1) and (12.3) indicates that the 
coefficient on the unemployment variable (a^) and the sum of 
coefficients on the effective exchange rate variable (ag) are no longer 
significant. The t -s ta tis t ic  for a ll other variables remains 
insignificant, and a sign reversal on the sum of coefficients on the 
short-term interest rate variable (ag) and on the balance of payments 
variable (a^) is observed. For a ll other variables the sign remains 
the same and the sum of coefficients registers an increase or a 
decrease. A comparision of the two restricted models, [ i . e . ,  (12.2) 
and (12.4)] also suggests a similar pattern of changes in the results. 
The coefficient on the unemployment variable is no longer significant 
and the sum of coefficients on the effective exchange rate variable is 
only marginally significant (at the 10% level) in equation (12.4).
For a ll other variables, while the sign remains the same, the sum of 
coefficients and the corresponding t-values register an increase or a 
decrease. 7
These results suggest that only variations in the effective  
exchange rate variable have a systematic impact on monetary policy in 
the U.K. As seen in Table 13 a one percent increase in the index of 
the effective exchange rate led to a .0005% increase in the MS in the 
same period ( t ) ,  a .0006% increase in the MS in the next quarter and a 
.0007% increase in the MS in the third quarter (t+2). Only the last 
coefficient is significant at the 10% level. However, by the end of 
the third quarter, a sustained one percent increase in the effective  
exchange rate was associated with a .0018% increase in the growth rate 
of the monetary base, though this coefficient is marginally significant 
at the 10% level.
While no lasting impact of other economic variables on monetary 
policy is detected, an analysis of the individual coefficients on 
these variables is warranted in order to detect the temporary 
influences, i f  any. An analysis of Table 13 shows that in the 
short-run some of these variables do influence monetary policy.
The sums of coefficients on the fiscal-policy variable (a^) and 
the interest rate variable (ag) are s ta tis tic a lly  insignificant, but
7These results were sensitive to the l is t  of the Instrumental 
variables used in estimation. When (12.4) was reestimated using 
exactly the same set of instrumental variables as equation (12.3) 
( i .e . ,  five lagged values for the wage rate variable, balance of 
payments variables and one lagged value for the price variable were 
not dropped from the set of instrumental variables), the sums of 
coefficients on the effective exchange rate variable (a«) and the 
budget surplus variable (a ,)  were s ta tis tic a lly  significant at the 5% 
level. The sum of coefficients on a ll explanatory variables had the 
same sign.
these variables made some temporary contributions to the monetary 
policy in the U.K. as is evident from the individual lagged 
coefficients on these variables (Table 13). One lagged coefficient on 
the fiscal policy variable is significant. Individual lagged 
coefficients on the budget surplus variable reveal the oscillatory 
reaction patterns of the monetary authority. An increase in the ratio  
of the real budget surplus to real trend GNP of 1% led to a decrease 
of 1.77% in the M& in the seventh quarter (t+6).
One lagged coefficient on the short-term interest rate variable 
(t-4 ) is s ta tis tic a lly  significant. I t  shows the delayed response of 
the monetary authority to variations in the short-term interest rate. 
For every percentage point increase in the short-term interest rate 
( r ) ,  the growth rate of the monetary base increased by .007% during 
the f if th  quarter (t+4), provided r remains at the new level for the 
next four quarters. This result suggests that the monetary authority 
responded only with a long lag to a disturbance in the financial 
sector.
In summation, the estimated equations establish the effective 
exchange rate variable as a systematic determinant of monetary policy 
in the U.K. While other economic variables had no lasting impact on 
monetary policy, interim adjustments in the monetary base took place 
in response to changes in the budget surplus and the short-term 
interest rate.
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Table 3. Definition of Variables: United Kingdom
M6t  = Quarterly rate of change of the monetary base, period t .
lftt  = Quarterly rate of change of international reserves,
period t .
AlRt  = Quarterly changes in international reserves, period t .
SURt = Detrended budget surplus,
^Nominal budget surplus^ per1od t>
Trend real GNP x fFU 
TUO
AEEXRt  = Quarterly changes in the index of the effective exchange
rate, period t .
AEXRt  = Quarterly changes in the index of bilateral exchange
rate, period t .
= Quarterly rate of change in wages, period t .
Art  = Quarterly changes in short-term interest rate, period t .
AUNt  = Quarterly changes in the unemployment rate, period t .
0Rt  = Output ra tio , period t .
0Gt  = Output gap, period t .
= Quarterly rate of change in prices, period t .
ATBt  = Quarterly changes in trade balance, period t .
ABOPCEL = Quarterly changes in balance of payments, current
balance, period t .
Table 4. Determination o f Lag Length and Specific  Gravity of
Manipulated Variables in  B ivaria te  Equations: United
Kingdom.
M6t ' C + I  a,. D. + Z 3n i= l 1 1 n=0 Xt n*t-n
Manipulated Minimum Lag R2 Specific
Variable FPE Length Gravity
Ift .00144442 1 .609381 694.44
air .00153847 0 .579785 649.99
SUR .00146141 6 .623429 684.93
AEEXR .00146584 2 .607473 680.27
aEXR .00155811 0 .574421 641.80
ft .00147918 1 .599980 675.68
Ar .00149545 0 .591536 666.67
AUN .00151112 0 .587255 661.76
OR .00155515 0 .575230 643.02
OG .00155872 0 .574255 641.03
P .00154853 1 .581225 645.16
ABOPCB " .00155013 0 .576599 645.11
atb .00155959 0 .574016 641.19
Variables are defined in Table 3.
All equations have the functional form given at the top of this table.
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Table 5. Determination o f Lag Length and S pecific  G ravity o f
Manipulated Variables in T r iv a r ia te  Equations: United
Kingdom.
3 1 * 12 MB. = C + I  a.D. + l a , .  IR. u + 2 6n X+
4 1=1 1 1 k=0 t_k n=0 n t-n
Variable0
ift(u
Manipulated
Variable
Minimum
FPE
Lag
Length 
(in quarters)
R2 Specific
Gravity
AEEXR .00135652 2 .643733 736.920
AEXR .00147490 0 .605049 678.012
W .00136324 1 .638491 733.676
SUR .00137372 6 .652578 727.802
AUN .00141701 0 .620549 705.711
OG .00147426 0 .605220 678.426
OR .00147449 0 .605157 678.201
•
P • .00145470 1 .614240 687.285
Ar .00146529 0 .607620 682.594
ABOPCB .00145665 0 .609935 686.507
ATB .00146267 0 .608322 683.681
The number 1n parentheses beside the controlled variable 1s the optimal 
order of the lag (in quarters).
Variables are defined 1n Table 3.
A ll equations have the functional form given a t the top o f th is  tab le .
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Table 6. Determination o f Lag Length and Specific  G ravity of
Manipulated Variables in  M u ltiv a ria te  Equations: United
Kingdom.
3 1 2 12
Manipulated
Variable
Minimum
FPE
Lag
Length 
(in quarters)
R2 Specifi i 
Gravity
SUR .00120883 6 .702543 827.267
ft .00130248 1 .664380 767.754
AUN .00134979 0 .648876 740.856
OR .00137416 0 .642538 727.717
OG .00138567 0 .639543 721.657
ABOPCB .00137034 0 .643531 729.746
ATB .00137522 0 .642263 727.156
p .00137435 1 .645861 727.590
Ar .00137862 4 .654537 725.374
aThe numbers in parentheses beside the controlled variables are the 
optimal order of the lags (in quarters).
Variables are defined in Table 3.
A ll equations have the functional form given a t the top o f th is  ta b le .
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Table 7. Determination o f Lag Length and Specific  G ravity of
Manipulated Variables in  M u ltiv a ria te  Equations: United
. Kingdom.
3 1 . 2  6
12
Manipulated
Variable
Minimum
FPE
Lag
Length 
(in quarters)
R2 Specific
Gravity
AUN .00116905 0 .714900 855.395
OR .00121040 0 .704815 830.565
OG .00121547 1 .706206 822.707
Ar .00119487 4 .718651 836.890
ft .00121051 0 .704789 826.105
ABOPCB .00123001 0 .700032 813.002
atb .00123506 0 .698802 809.677
P .00123460 0 .698913 809.979
aThe numbers in parentheses beside the controlled variables are the 
optimal order of the lags (in quarters).
Variables are defined in Table 3.
A ll equations have the functional form given a t the top o f th is  tab le .
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Table 8. Determination o f Lag Length and Specific  G ravity o f
Manipulated Variables in  M u ltiv a ria te  Equations: United
Kingdom.
1
MBt  -  C +i=V i Di +kf Qalk IRt-k  +kf 0a2k * EEXRt-k  +,.L a3k SURt-k  +
6
I
k=0
a4 MJNt  + Xt _n.
Controlled Manipulated 
Variable Variable
Minimum
FPE
Lag
Length 
(in quarters)
Specific
Gravity
I f t ( l )
AEEXR(2)
SUR(6)
AUN(O)
Ar .00114650 4 .732348 872.220
W .00115382 4 .730638 866.686
.00118005 3 .722140 847.422
ABOPCB .00119313 0 .711602 838.132
ATB .00119427 0 .711326 837.332
aThe numbers in parentheses beside the controlled variables 
optimal order of the lags (in quarters).
See Table 3 for definition of the variables.
are the
A ll equations have the functional form given a t the top o f th is  ta b le .
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Table 9. Determination o f Lag Length and Specific  Gravity of
Manipulated Variables in M u ltiv a ria te  Equations: United
Kingdom.
Mfit  = C +i f 1“i Di +kf 0fllk Iftt“k +k=092k AEEXRt_k V - 033k SURt"k +
4 12
a4 AUNt  +kf 0a5k Art-k  +nf 06n Xt-n ‘
Controlled Manipulated 
Variable Variable
Minimum Lag 
FPE Length
_______ (in quarters)
Specific
Gravity
Ift ( l)
AEEXR(2)
SUR(6)
AUN(O)
Ar(4)
(J .00106985 .760478 934.710
ABOPCB
aTB
.00109331
.00114154
4
4
.755226
.744427
914.654
876.010
.00116460 .737109 858.664
aThe numbers in parentheses beside the controlled variables are the 
optimal order of the lags (in quarters).
See Table 3 for definition of the variables.
A ll equations have the functional form given a t the top o f th is  tab le .
Table 10. Determination o f Lag Length and Specific  G ravity o f
Manipulated Variables in  M u ltiva ria te  Equations: United
Kingdom.
M6t  = C +i l 1a i Di +kf 0alk lftt-k  +kf 0a2k AEEXRt-k  +kf 0a3k SURt-k  + 
a4 AUNt  +k?0a5k Art-k  +kf 0a6k ftt-k  +n?o0n Xt-n*
Controlled Manipulated Minimum Lag R Specific
Variable Variable FPE Length Gravity
_________      (in quarters) __ ________
If t ( l )
AEEXR(2)
SUR(6)
AUN(O)
Ar(4)
ft(4)
ABOPCB
atb
.00102255
.00106268
4
5
.780080
.773236
977.947
941.017
P .00108449 .761115 922.092
aThe numbers in parentheses beside the controlled variables are the 
optimal order of the lags (in quarters).
See Table 3 for definition of the variables.
A ll equations have the functional form given a t the top o f th is  tab le .
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Table 11. Determination o f Lag Length and S pecific  G ravity o f
Manipulated Variables in M u ltiv a ria te  Equations: United
Kingdom.
Mfet  = C +k?0alk ^ t -k  +kf 0a2k AEEXRt-k  +kf 0a3k SURt“k +
a4 AUNt  +k=0a5k Art"k +k=oafik fet"k +k=oa?k AB0PCBt-k  +
12
S Bn h n*
n=0 n tmn
p
Controlled Manipulated Minimum Lag R
Variable Variable FPE Length
      (in quarters) __
I f t ( l)
AEEXR(2)
SUR(6)
AUN(O)
Ar(4) 
ft(4)
AB0PCB(4)
P .00103327 0 .779511 968.335
aThe numbers in parentheses beside the controlled variables are the 
optimal order of the lags (in quarters).
See Table 3 for definition of the variables.
A ll equations have the functional form given a t the top o f th is  ta b le .
Specific
Gravity
Table 12. Estimation Results Using U.K. Data -  Honey Supply Reaction Functions: 1960:2 -  1983:4'
■ C + I  a . 
1 1=1 1
1
0 . + E a 
1 k=0 Ik  lftt -k
2
+ £ a«k 
k=0 Zlc
6
AEEXR+ v + E a,,, 
k=0 SURfk
+ a4 aUNt
4
+ 1 a5k k=0 5K
4
Art -k  + £*6k  bt -k
4
+ 1 a7k k=0 /K
AB0PCBt _k + a8Pt.
Eq.
No.
C “ 1 °2 °3 al a2 a3 a4 a5 a6 a7 a8 R D-W P
(12.1) .0072
(.32 )
-.0235
(-.56)
-.0369 .0603 
(-1 .50 ) (1.50)
-.0336
(-.9 8 )
.0009*
(2.25)
-.4068
(-.7 1 )
-.0390*
(-2 .91 )
-.0008
(- .1 3 )
.2363
(.79 )
.00001
(.5 2 )
.2963
(1.03)
.746 2.04 -.199
(-1 .9 7 )
(12.2) .0054
(.24 )
-.0215
( - 5 1 )
-.0305 .0611 
(-1 .2 7 ) (1.53)
-.0202
( -.6 2 )
.0009*
(2.20)
-.5990
(-1.10)
-.0357*
(-2 .73 )
.0005
(.08 )
.3877
(1.48)
.00001
(.2 9 )
.748 2.03 -.189
(-1 .8 7 )
(12.3) .0025
(.07 )
-.0140
(-.21)
-.0312
(-.8 0 )
.0632
(.89 )
-.0275
(-.3 2 )
.0015
(1.24)
-.3729
(-.4 6 )
-.0239
(-.66)
.0017
(.15 )
.1445
(.27)
-.00001
(- .is ;
.3176
(.63 )
.750 2.05 -.208
(-2 .0 6 )
(12.4) .0163
(.34 )
-.0095
(-.0 9 )
-.0667* .0555 
(-2 .9 1 ) (.58 )
-.0274
(-.3 7 )
.0018**
(1.60)
-.9290
(-.5 9 )
-.0108
(-.5 6 )
.0145
(1.06)
.624 2.03 -.249
-2.49
Notes:
Figures 1n parentheses are t-stat1st1cs o f the coeffic ients.
An *  Indicates significance a t the St level and a ** Indicates significance a t the 102 le v e l.
2 2R « R adjusted fo r degrees of freedom.
See Table 3 fo r defin ition  o f variables.
(12 .1) and (12.2) are estimated with the OLS combined with Cochrane-Orcutt f irs t-o rd e r serla l-corre la tlon  correction, 
while (12 .3) and (12.4) are estimated with the IV procedure combined with Cochrane-Orcutt f i r s t  order seria l correlation  
correction procedure.
Table 13. Money Supply Reaction Function: United Kingdom
Estimation Period: 1960:2 -  1983:4.
Method of Estimation: Instrument Variable with Serial
Correlation Correction
Dependent Variable: M&t  = [Log (MBt /MBt _ j) ] .
Explanatory
Variable
C
D1
Do
Ift
t
t -1
Estimated
Coefficient
.016301
-.009489
-.066735
.055541
-.117106
.089708
T-Statistic
.3379
-.0895
-2.9179
.5785
-.9859
1.2689
AEEXR
t
t -1
t -2
.000519
.000611
.000663
.4010
1.0611
1.6034
SUR
t
t -1
t -2
t-3
t-4
t-5
t -6
-.154920
-.085171
-.992241
1.224036
-.773643
1.627462
•1.774608
-.1279
-.7266
-.9013
.8997
-.4095
1.2479
-2.4380
Table 13 (continued).
Explanatory
Variable
AUN
Estimated
Coefficient
-.010835
T-Statistic
-.5579
Ar
t
t -1
t -2
t-3
t-4
.010452
-.003460
.004974
-.004704
.007269
.6226
-.3537
.7156
-1.0698
1.9907
Standard Error of Regression = .0364546 
D-W S tatis tic  = 2.03 
Final Value of rho = .2497 
T-Statisties for rho = 2.499 
See Table 3 for definition of the variables.
I I .  West Germany
Estimation of the reaction function for West Germany essentially 
followed the same procedure as used for the United Kindgom. The 
estimation results for West Germany are reported in Tables 15-24. 
Variables used in these Tables are defined in Table 14. All the 
equations are estimated for quarterly data over the identical sample 
period (1960:2 -  1983:4) used for the United Kindgom. A suitable lag 
length is searched over the maximum time period of twelve quarters.
Tables 15-22 develop the basic form of the linear reaction 
function and determine the order in which relevant explanatory 
variables are added to the money supply reaction function along with 
the appropriate lag length of each explanatory variable. A constant 
term and three seasonal dummies have been added to each equation. 
From this step-wise procedure the basic model of the following form 
emerged:®
3 3 1 3
M&t » C + 1 * ^  + . j  Ifct  +|(t oa2kAUNt _|( + l =a3kAEEXRt . k ♦ f
a5DEBTt  + agClt  +87^  + agArt  (4*4)
Once the lag length on each causal variable and the order in which
these variables enter the equation has been determined, an OLS estimate
of this equation was obtained. The D-W s ta tis tic  for the estimated
q
OLS equation was 2.49. Since the D-W bounds test was inconclusive, 
®See Table 14 for definition of variables.
®The D-W test s ta tis tic  (d*) is 2.49. For 95 observations and 19 
Independent variables (including the constant term), lower and upper 
bounds on this s ta tis tic  are 1.247 (d ,) and 2.126 (d ) respectively at 
the 5 percent level. D-W bounds test for the presence of the f ir s t -  
order serial correlation is inconclusive since d.<4-d<d . See A. 
Koutsoyiannis (1977), p. 214.
the Q-statistic was computed to test for autocorrelation in the 
residuals. The Q test indicated the presence of autocorrelation in 
the residuals. The estimated value of the Q statistics (for the 
firs t-order serial correlation) for this equation was 6.78. The null 
hypothesis of no first-order serial correlation was rejected at the 5% 
level since the calculated value of the Q s ta tis tic  is higher than the 
critic a l value of at the 5% level (.0039). Since the OLS
results are ineffic ient in the presence of a seria lly  correlated error 
term, the Cochrane-Orcutt (C-0) iterative procedure for the correction 
for firs t-order autocorrelation was combined with OLS.
The estimated reaction function of the monetary authority in West 
Germany is presented in Table 23. Equation (23.1) reports the OLS 
estimates, corrected for first-order serial correlation, for the model 
specified in equation (4 .4 ). In this equation significant coefficients 
on the international reserves variable (a^) and the government debt ' 
variable (ag) are reported. The estimated coefficient on the price 
variable (a^) is significant only at the 20% level of significance. 
Even though the sums of coefficients on the unemployment rate variable 
(ag), the effective exchange rate variable (ag) ,  and the trade balance 
variable (a^) are insignificant, s ta tis tica lly  significant individual 
coefficients on these variables were reported. Since variations in the 
wage rate variable (ag) and the short-term interest rate variable (ag) 
do not contribute to the behavior of the monetary authority, the 
reaction function is reestimated after dropping these variables. 
Results are reported in equation (23.2).
Both equations (23.1) and (23.2) are estimated using the OLS and 
C-0 procedures. Both equations exhibit similar signs on a ll
coefficients; the coefficient on the government debt variable (ag) 
remains significant at the 10% level and the coefficient on the 
international reserves variable (a^) remains significant at the five 
percent level. Thus, a similar pattern of results is observed in both 
equations. 10 These results suggest that the monetary authority in West 
Germany responded to the changes in the international trade variable 
and the government debt variable. An improvement in the reserve 
position led to monetary expansion. For every percentage point 
increase in ift, the growth rate of the monetary base (M6) increased by 
.14% in the same period. The evidence also suggests that the monetary 
authorities have no inclination to accomodate a fiscal d e fic it, since 
the coefficient on the governmental debt variable is s ta tis tica lly  
significant with a; negative sign indicating that expansionary fiscal 
policies are countered by restrictive monetary policies.
To take into account the possible endogeneity among contempor­
aneous values of the causal and caused variables, equation (23.1) and
(23.2) are reestimated using the instrumental variable technique (with 
f ir s t  order serial correlation correction). A time trend, a detrended 
government expenditure (current and three lagged values) variable, one 
additional lag on each explanatory variable, and the lagged dependent 
variable were used as instrumental variables. Lagged dependent 
variable (M6t _ j) *s usecl as an instrumental variable, since Fair's  
technique for choosing the set of instrumental variables is followed.
10The Q-statistics for the first-order serial correlation for 
equations (23.1) and (23.2), are .000085 and .000072. Since the 
estimated value of the Q statistics are lower than the tabulated value 
of x f i )  (.0039), the null hypothesis of no further first-order serial 
correlation ( i . e . ,  Ho: pj = p2 = . . .  = p^  =0) is not rejected.
According to Fair (1970), the lagged dependent and independent 
variables should be included as separate instruments to ensure 
consistent instrumental variable estimates in models with a f ir s t -  
order serial correlation correction. The sums of the coefficients on 
different explanatory variables and the significance of their sums (in 
terms of t-s ta tis tic s ) are reported in equations (23.3) and (23.4) in 
Table 23. The change in the nature of the results that takes place 
with the use of the instrumental variable (IV) technique points to 
simultaneity problems. Comparing equations (23.1) and (23.3) (both 
equations estimate the same model with OLS and IV respectively), we 
observe a sign reversal on coefficients on the fiscal policy variable 
(ag) ,  the wage rate variable (ag) ,  and the short term interest rate 
variable (ag) with the use of the IV procedure. The coefficients on 
the international reserves variable (a^) and the government debt 
variable are no longer significant. The insignificant t-s ta tis tic  on 
a ll other economic variables suggests that none of these variables has 
a lasting impact on the behavior of the monetary authority.
A restricted model was estimated a fter dropping the last four 
explanatory variables from the reaction function ( i . e . ,  the government 
debt variable, the wage rate variable, the price variable and the 
short-term interest rate variables). These variables are dropped 
because of the reported insignificant coefficients in equation (23.3). 
However, 1t should be noted that the trade balance variable and other 
variables with insignificant t-s ta tis tics  for the sums of their 
coefficients are not dropped because individual significant coeffi­
cients were observed on these variables. The international reserves 
variable was retained in spite of an insignificant coefficient (a^)
because this variable is highly significant in equations (23.1) and
(23.2).
A comparison of equations (23.2) and (23.4) also reveals some 
significant changes from the OLS results (23.2) when the model is 
reestimated with IV (23.4). Even though the signs on a ll economic 
variables remain the same, some coefficients change in magnitude 
(e .g ., the coefficient on the international reserves variable, a^, 
increases from .14 to .16). The coefficient on the international 
reserve variable is significant at the 10% level. A 1% point increase 
in international reserves (e .g ., from .01 to . 02) led to an increase 
in M8 of .16% in the same period.
Instrumental Variable results (23.4) seem to suggest that other 
economic variables under consideration do not have a lasting effect on 
the behavior of the monetary authority in West Germany. However, i t  is 
possible that some temporary adjustments in the monetary base take 
place in response to changes in these variables. To analyze the 
interim changes in the behavior of the monetary authority, detailed 
results of equation (23.4) are required. The detailed estimation 
results for equation (23.4) are contained in Table 24.
Even though the sums of the coefficients on the unemployment 
variable, the effective exchange rate variable and the trade balance 
variable are insignificant, these factors have contributed to monetary 
policy as is evident from the Individual lagged coefficients on these 
variables (Table 24). Some delayed response of the monetary authority 
to changes in the unemployment rate is suggested. An Increase of one 
percentage point 1n the unemployment rate in period 0 led to a . 02% 
decrease in MB in the third quarter ( t  + 2) . The monetary authority
reduced the supply o f  money in accordance with the reduction in the
demand for money caused by a decline in the level of the economic
activ ity . Thus, monetary authorities appear to have responded 
temporarily in a procyclical fashion to the change in the unemployment 
rate. However, this variable exercised no permanent influence on 
monetary policy.
A one percent increase in the effective exchange rate led to a
.0009% decrease in the M6 in the next quarter (t+1). Table 24
suggests that an increase in the trade balance of one million DM in 
period t  led to a .02% decrease in M& in the third quarter (t+2) and a 
.01% increase in MS in the fourth quarter (t+3). But, variations in 
trade balance did not have any lasting impact on the monetary base.
The result of this study are somewhat disappointing and are not 
consistent with those of previous studies. A priori i t  might be 
expected that the German monetary authority has given special 
attention to the price s tab ility  goal because of Germany's previous 
experience with hyperinflation. Our findings, however, suggest that 
the inflation rate was not a determinant of the monetary base for the 
period under review. This result does not compare well with previous 
studies. Mi 11ms (1983) established the price s tab ility  goal as the 
major determinant of monetary policy in West Germany over the period 
1960-1982. Hodgman and Resek (1983) also found evidence that monetary 
policy reacted systematically to movements in the price variable.
Hodgman and Resek (1983) established evidence relating monetary 
policy to the external s tab ility  objective (some evidence of external 
s tab ility  objective is established in the present study), cyclical 
factors (rate of capacity u tiliza tio n ) and price in fla tion . As in our
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Table 14. Definition of Variables: West Germany
MBt  = Quarterly rate of change of the monetary base, period t
IRt  = Quarterly rate of change of international reserves, period t .
AIRt  = Quarterly changes in international reserves, period t .
AEEXRt = Quarterly changes in the index of effective exchange rate, 
period t .
AEXRt  = Quarterly changes in the index of b ilateral exchange rate 
between Deutsche Mark and dollar, period t .
AUNt  = Quarterly changes in the unemployment rate, period t .
0Gt  = Output gap, period t .
0Rt  = Output ratio , period t .
Pt  = Quarterly rate of change in prices, period t .
ABOPCEL = Quarterly changes in balance of payments, current balance, 
period t .
ATBt  = Quarterly changes in trade balance, period t .
SURt  = Detrended budget surplus
/Nominal budqet surplus^ period t .
'Trend realSNP x IPD >
T O
DEBTt  = Detrended change in Government debt
/A Nominal Government d e b t period t .
' Trend real QNP x TFT) '
T O
Art  = Quarterly changes in short-term interest rate (call-money 
rate ), period t .
Clt  = Quarterly rate of change in wages, period t .
Table 15. Determination o f Lag Length and Specific  G ravity o f
Manipulated Variables in B ivaria te  Equations: West Germany.
3 12
MS. = C + E a,D, + E 6 Xt  
1 i= l n=0
Manipulated
Variable
(X)
Minimum
FPE
Lag Length 
(in quarters)
R2 Specific
Gravity
ift .00159767 0 .514753 625.90
air .00176233 0 .464744 568.18
atb .00177793 3 .475732 562.46
abopcb .00195700 1 .411502 510.99
OR .00187657 6 .462309 532.88
OG .00191115 7 .457518 523.26
AUN .00182958 3 .460503 546.57
aeexr .00184960 1 .443801 540.66
aexr .00205780 0 .375004 485.44
ft .00205057 0 .377197 487.66
Ar .00205397 0 .376166 486.85
f* .00206092 0 .374054 485.20
SUR .00206183 0 .373780 485.01
DEBT .00255521 0 .375790 391.39
Variables are defined in Table 14.
A ll equations have the functional form given a t the top o f th is  Table.
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Table 16. Determination o f Lag Length and Specific  G ravity o f
Manipulated Variables in T r iv a ria te  Equations: West Germany.
MBt  = C + l  a1D1 + a2 IRt  +^ n  Xt-n*
p
Controlled Manipulated Minimum Lag Length R Specifc
Variable Variable FPE (in quarters) Gravity
___________________m ____ ____________________________ ________  _______
IR(0)
AUN .00147176 3 .570188 679.49
OR .00154179 6 .562362 648.59
OG .00157861 7 .556057 633.47
ATB .00152807 3 .553744 654.45
ABOPCB .00154540 1 .539833 647.08
AEEXR .00153426 1 .543149 651.80
AEXR .00162992 0 .509859 613.53
W .00162779 0 .510500 614.33
Ar .00162983 0 .509888 613.57
•
P .00163167 0 .509334 612.86
SUR .00163173 0 .509317 612.86
DEBT .00162508 0 .511316 615.35
aThe number in parentheses beside the controlled variable is the 
optimal order of the lag (in quarters).
Variables are defined in Table 14.
A ll equations have the functional form given a t the top o f th is  Table.
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Table 17. Determination o f Lag Length and S pecific  Gravity of
Manipulated Variables in M u ltiv a ria te  Equations: West
Germany.
, 3 . 3  12-
MB. = C + E a .D. + a. IR. + E a,., AUN+ ,  + Z Sn X. . 
z i= l 1 1 z k=0 dK n=0 n T‘ n
p
Controlled Manipulated Minimum Lag Length R Specific
Variable Variable FPE (in quarters) Gravity
 :_____  ( x ) _________________________ ________  _________
ift(o)
AUN(3)
AEEXR .00138404 1 .603431 722.54
aexr .00150300 0 .565243 665.34
atb .00140969 3 .603563 709.37
abopcb .00147773 7 .599270 676.73
p .00149828 0 .566609 667.56
ft .00150042 0 .565990 666.49
Ar .00150078 0 .565886 666.22
SUR .00150338 0 .565135 665.16
DEBT .00149898 0 .566408 667.16
aThe numbers in parentheses beside the controlled variables are the 
optimal order of the lags (in quarters).
Variables are defined in Table 14.
A ll equations have the functional form given a t the top o f th is  Table.
Table 18. Determination o f Lag Length and Specific  Gravity o f
Manipulated Variables in M u ltiv a ria te  Equations: West
Germany.
MEt  = C +i f l °l1Di + al !^t +kf 0a2k AUNt-k  +kf 0a3k AEEXRt-k  * =g en Xt-
p
Controlled Manipulated Minimum Lag Length R Specific
Variable Variable FPE (in quarters) Gravity
‘ ( X ) ____________________________ ________  _________
l f t (0)
AUN(3)
AEEXR(l)
ATB .00129920 3 .641277 769.70
ABOPCB .00137620 1 .598856 726.64
P .00140595 0 .600918 711.23
(i .00140632 0 .600814 711.08
Ar .00141256 . 0 .599041 • 707.97
SUR .00141392 0 .598657 707.26
DEBT .00140218 0 .597136 713.16
aThe numbers in parentheses beside the controlled variables are the 
optimal order of the lags (in quarters).
Variables are defined in Table 14.
A ll equations have the functional form given a t the top o f th is  Table.
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Table 19. Determination o f  Lag Length and Specific  Gravity o f
Manipulated Variables in  M u ltiv a r ia te  Equations: West
Germany.
«6t  = C + j p D ,  + #1 Iftt  + j oa2k + j oa3k AEEXRt _k +
4TBt-k  +^ 0en Xt-n ‘
O
Controlled Manipulated Minimum Lag Length R Specific
Variable Variable FPE (in quarters) Gravity
_________  ( X ) ___________;____________  _  ________
l ft(0)
AUN(3)
AEEXR(l)
ATB(3)
DEBT .00129827 0 .644764 770.24
SUR .00132736 0 .636803 753.35
P .00132126 0 .638473 756.89
A .00132577 0 .637240 754.26
Ar .00132618 0 .637128 754.03
aThe numbers in parentheses beside the controlled variables are the 
optimal order of the lags (in quarters).
Variables are defined in Table 14.
A ll equations have the functional form given a t the top o f th is  Table.
Table 20. Determination o f Lag Length and Specific  G ravity of
Manipulated Variables in M u ltiv a ria te  Equations: West
Germany.
M6t  = C +i f 1ai Di + al  IRt  +kf 0a2k AUNt-k  +i,fna3k AEEXRt-k  \ L a4k
12
1
£
k=0
ATB. i. + aK DEBTx + £ 8 X* . t-k  5 t  n_Q n t-n
3
£
k=0
Controlled Manipulated Minimum Lag Length 
Variable Variable FPE (in quarters)
_______________  £X)____________________________
Specific
Gravity
ift(o)
AUN(3) 
AEEXR(l) 
ATB(3) 
DEBT(O)
w .00131676 0 .642921 759.44
p .00131813 0 .642549 758.65
Ar .00132461 0 .640792 754.94
aThe numbers in parentheses besides the controlled variables are the 
optimal order of the lags (in quarters).
Variables are defined in Table 14.
A ll equations have the functional form given a t the top o f th is  Table.
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Table 21. Determination o f Lag Length and S pecific  G ravity of
Manipulated Variables in M u ltiv a ria te  Equations: West
Germany.
M®t = C +i ^1° i Di + al ! ^t +kf 0a2k AUNt-k  +kf 0a3k AEEXRt“k \ l 0^
12
ATB. . + ac DEBT* + a , i  + Z 3B X+ n. t-k  5 t  6 t  n=g n t-n
Controlled Manipulated 
Variable Variable
   m ____
Minimum Lag Length 
FPE (in quarters)
Specific
Gravity
l f t (0)
AUN(3) 
AEEXR(l) 
ATB(3) 
DEBT(O) 
W(0)
P
Ar
.00133487
.00134375
0
0
.641214
.638826
749.14
744.19
The numbers in parentheses beside the controlled variables are the 
optimal order of the lags (in quarters).
Variables are defined in Table 14.
A ll equations have the functional form given a t the top o f th is  Table.
Table 22. Determination o f Lag Length and Specific  G ravity of
Manipulated Variables in M u ltiv a ria te  Equations: West
Germany.
M6t  = C +  I f t t  + j fla 2k AUNt _ k + AEEXRt _ k +  2 ^
ATBt-k  + a5 DEBTt  + a6 ®t + a7 +n50Sn Xt-n -
Controlled Manipulated Minimum Lag Length 
Variable Variable FPE (in quarters)
   m  ______________:_______
Specific
Gravity
l f t (0)
AUN(3)
aeexr( i )
ATB(3) 
DEBT(O)
ft(0)
P(0)
Ar .00136368 .636684 733.31
The numbersin parentheses besides the controlled variables are the 
optimal order of the lags (in quarters).
Variables are defined in Table 14.
A ll equations have the functional form given a t the top o f th is  Table.
Table 23. Estimation Results Using German Data -  Money Supply Reaction Function: 1960:2 -1983:4 
3 3 1 3
t  ‘  C + *1 Iftt  +k! Qa2k AUNt-k  \ f 0a3k AEEXRt-k  + kf Qa4k ATBt-k  + a5 DEBTt  + a6 ftt  + a7 K  + a8 AV
Eq.
No.
C “ 1 °2 a3 a l a2 a3 a4 a5 a6 a7 a8 «2 D-W p
(23.1) .0424* -.0624* -.0051
*4
-.0351 r .1385* -.0224 .0001 .0079 -2.2475** -.1748 .8788 .0006 .58 2.00 -.300
(3.18) (-3 .25 ) (-.2 8 ) (-1 .86) (3.28) (-1 .2 7 ) (.20 ) (.6 2 ) (-1 .82 ) ( - .7 3 ) (1.42) (.14 ) (-3 .05 )
(23.2) .0396* -.0631* -.0071
*4
-.0353 r .1388* -.0229 .0001 .0082 -  1.9108** .8124 .59 2.00 -.3016
(3.13) (-3 .3 3 ) (-.3 9 ) (-1 .89 ) (3.59) (-1 .4 3 ) (-24) (.67 ) (-1 .6 9 ) (1.38) (-3 .07)
(23.3) .0261 -.0769* .0023 -.0226 .0724 -.0650 .0015 .0015 .3785 .2104 1.1379 -.0164 .54 1.90 -.271
(1.30) (-3 .06 ) (.08 ) (-.8 4 ) (.52 ) (-1 .0 8 ) (.55 ) (.06 ) (.14 ) (.2 6 ) (.76 ) (-.7 3 ) (-2 .73 )
(23.4) .0354* -.0668* .0125 -.0296 .1637** -.0229 .00008 .0140 .64 1.96 -.255
(2.87) (-3 .30 ) (.51 ) (-1 .53 ) (1.64) (-1 .32 ) (.07 ) (.9 0 ) (-2 .55)
Notes:
Figures In  parentheses are t-s ta t ls t lc s  o f the sum o f the coeffic ien ts .
R* *  adjusted fo r degrees o f freedom.
Variables are defined In Table 14.
An *  Indicates significance a t the 5Z level and a * *  Indicates significance a t the 10Z leve l.
(23.1) and (23.2) have been estimated with OLS while (24.3) and (24 .4) have been estimated with IV procedure. These 
estimation procedures are used In conjunction with the Cochrane-Orcutt Ite ra tiv e  procedure to adjust fo r f irs t-o rd e r  
serial correlation In residuals.
Table 24. Money Supply Reaction Function: West Germany
Estimation Period: 1960:2 -  1983:4.
Method of Estimation = Instrumental Variable with Serial 
Correlation Correction
Dependent Variable: M&t  = Log (M I^/M B ^).
Explanatory Estimated T-statis tic
Variable Coefficient_______________________
Ift
AUN
C .035413 2.8664
D. -.066801 -3.2998
Di .012506 .5086
-.029648 -1.5274
.163709 1.6453
t  -.005793 -.3053
t-1  -.004715 -.4009
t-2  -.024657 -2.4755
t-3  .012242 1.2216
t  .000949 .5863
t-1  -.000868 -1.4026
t  .019875 1.0088
t-1  -.001386 -.1314
t-2  -.019564 -1.8759
t-3  .015087 1.4278
Standard Error of the Regression = .033544
D-W Statistic  = 1.9548
AEEXR
ATB
No. of observations = 94 
Final value of rho = -.2546 
t-s ta tis tic  for rho = -2.5532
Variables are defined in Table 14.
study, the government budget d e fic it had no significant influence on 
German monetary policy. Gordon (1977), however, found evidence of 
both a positive budget deficit-money supply linkage and a positive 
wage-money supply linkage that have not been substantiated by any 
other study. Countercyclical policy reactions were also noted by him, 
leading him to say that German authorities are "...inconsistent, 
resisting higher prices of traded goods but allowing the growth rate 
of the money supply to rise in response to higher wage rates" (Gordon, 
1977, p. 434).
In summation, the estimated reaction functions in this study 
establish the international reserves variables as a systematic 
determinant of the monetary policy. Some temporary adjustments in 
monetary base are also observed. The Bundesbank has adjusted the 
monetary base in a procyclical manner. Short-term adjustments in the 
monetary policy do take place in response to changes in the foreign 
trade variables.
I I I .  Canada
The final country in our sample is Canada. Tables 26-33 develop 
the basic form of the monetary policy reaction function. Variables 
used in Tables 26-36 are defined in Table 25. Relevant explanatory 
variables in the estimated reaction function are chosen, on the basis 
of the specific gravity criterion , from the set of plausible 
explanatory variables. The appropriate lag length for every 
explanatory variable 1s searched over twelve quarters. The chosen lag 
length is the one minimizing the Final Prediction Error [FPE]. The 
money supply reaction function of the following form was shaped by the 
step-wise procedure followed in Tables 26-33.
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3 3 4
M8t  -  C + ^ . , 0 ,  + a j 0Gt  + ^ 2k SURt . k art . k +
2
k?0a4k t^-k  + 85 AEEXRt  + a6 + a7 AB0PNTt  +
a8 (4.5)
The estimated reaction functions of the monetary authority in
Canada are reported in Table 34. Table 34 contains the sum of the 
coefficients on each independent variable and the significance of this 
sum (in terms of t-s ta tis tic s ). Equation (34.1) contains the OLS 
estimates of the model presented in equation (4 .5 ). Since the D-W 
statis tic  and the Q test indicated the absence of serial correlation, 
only OLS estimates are reported. Once this equation was estimated, 
separate F-tests were performed to test the jo in t significance of
coefficients on individual explanatory variables. Results of the 
F-tests are contained in Table 36.
The F-tests substantiate the hypothesis that variations in the 
index of the effective exchange rate, international reserves, balance 
of payments and wage rate are not associated with any variations in 
the monetary base in Canada for the sample period under study. The 
output gap, the budget surplus, the short-term interest rate, and the 
inflation rate are the relevant variables in explaining the behavior
of the monetary authority in Canada. The reaction function is
re-estimated, using OLS, after dropping the last four variables from 
equation (34.1). Equation (34.2) reports these estimates.
Equations (34.1) and (34.2) both yield the same statistical f i t  
for the reaction function (in terms of R ) and yield similar estimates 
for the sum of coefficients on different explanatory variables. The 
sums of coefficients on the short-term interest rate variable (a a n d  
the output gap variable (a^) remain significant at the 5% level. The
sum of the coefficients on the budget surplus variable (ag) is now
significant at the 5%Jevel (instead of the 10% leve l). Significant 
coefficients on the seasonal dummy variables suggest a seasonal
pattern in the behavior of the monetary authority. The estimated 
reaction function (34.2) establishes the interest rate variable, the 
economic activ ity  variable ( i . e . ,  the output gap variable), and the 
fiscal policy variable as the systematic determinants of the monetary 
policy in Canada for the sample period under consideration.
Equations (34.1) and (34.2) are re-estimated using the
instrumental variable (IV) technique to take into account any possible 
simultaniety problems. Results are contained in equations (34.3) and 
(34.4). Equation (34.3) reports the estimated parameters of the model 
specified in equation (4 .5 ). Since F-tests (Table 36) indicate that 
the coefficients on the effective exchange rate variable,- international 
reserves variable, balance of payments variable and the wage rate 
variable do not explain the variations in the monetary base, the 
reaction function is re-estimated after dropping these variables and 
using IV technique. The estimated reaction function is reported in 
equation (34.4). An inspection of the four equations in Table 34 
reveals that both the estimation procedures (OLS and IV) yield the 
same statis tica l f i t  (R ) for the reaction functions and similar signs 
for the sums of coefficients on different explanatory variables. A
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comparison of equations (34.1) and (34.3) reveals some changes in the 
magnitude of the sums of coefficients on different explanatory 
variables and the associated t-s ta tis tic s . The t-s ta tis tics  for the 
budget surplus variable (a2)» the short-term interest rate variable 
(a^) and the effective exchange rate variable (a^) decline 
significantly. The t-s ta tis t ic  for the sum of coefficients on the 
budget surplus variable registers a decline from 1.91 to 1.16 with the 
use of the IV technique, while the t-s ta tis t ic  for the sum of 
coefficients on the short-term interest rate variable changes from 
-2.53 to -1.40. Coefficients on the budget surplus variable and the 
short-term interest rate variable are no longer significant. The D-W 
sta tis tic  for equation (34.3) is in the inconclusive range.
A comparison of equations (34.2) and (34.4) exhibits no major 
changes from the OLS results when the instrumental variable technique 
is used. Both these equations establish the output gap variable, the 
fiscal policy variable and the short-term interest rate variable as 
systematic determinants of monetary policy (even though, the last two 
variables are significant only at the 10% level when the IV technique is 
used). The output gap variable has a positive sign and is significant 
at the 5% level of confidence. The positive sign on the output gap 
variable indicates a procyclical response of the monetary authority. 
The central bank responded to the increase in demand for money that 
accompanies an upswing in the level of economic activ ity  by expanding 
the monetary base. An increase in the output gap of 1% point ( i .e . ,  
from .01 to . 02) led to an increase in MS of .0026 percent in the same 
period. While the response of the monetary authority to a change in 
the level of economic activ ity  took place within the same time period,
considerable lags in monetary policy existed with respect to the other 
explanatory variables.
Equation (34.4) reveals a positive budget surplus-money supply 
linkage. A p r io r i» a positive coefficient was not expected. One 
plausible interpretation of this positive coefficient is as follows. 
Assuming that the budget surplus is an acceptable proxy for the stance 
of fiscal policy, an increase in the surplus should reduce aggregate 
demand. The Canadian central bank apparently responds by increasing 
monetary base growth. I t  seems to respond more to the macro 
consequences of the change in the surplus than to the money market 
consequences. A similar pattern of the reaction of the monetary 
authority is observed from the coefficient on the short-term interest 
rate variable. The short-term interest rate is related negatively to 
the growth rate of the monetary base and is significant at the 5% level 
of confidence. These results suggest that a rise in the interest rate 
leads the central bank to reduce MS.
An analysis of the individual lagged coefficients on different 
explanatory variables is needed in order to ascertain the temporary 
adjustments in the behavior of the monetary authority. The detailed 
estimation results for equation (34.4) are presented in Table 35.
An analysis of the individual lagged coefficients on the budget 
surplus variable reveals the oscillatory reaction pattern of the 
monetary authority. An increase in the budget surplus (as a ratio of 
real trend GNP) of 1% led to a contraction in the growth rate of 
monetary base of 1.55% in the third quarter (t+2), and a 2.14% increase 
in MB in the fourth quarter (t+3). Thus, over the four-quarter 
periods, the central bank of Canada reacted to a 1% increase in the
budget surplus (as a ratio of real .trend GNP) with a .723% increase in 
m6. I t  seems that the monetary authority tried to take into account 
both the macro consequences ( i .e . ,  price fluctuations) and the money 
market consequences ( i . e . ,  interest rate fluctuations) of the increase 
in the budget surplus, but its  responsiveness to the macro
implications of a budget surplus was greater than its  concern for the 
money market fluctuations.
A one unit increase in the short-term interest rate today leads 
to a .003% decrease in M§ in t+1 and a .007% decrease in M6 in t+4.
Thus, i f  r rises by 1% in period 0, and remains at the new level for
the next four quarters, then at the end of the f if th  quarter (t+4), MS 
w ill be .0087% lower than before the sustained 1% increase in r took 
place. I t  seems that the central bank in Canada acted so as to
reinforce rather than to reduce the fluctuations in the short-term 
interest rate.
The sum of coefficients on the price variable has the expected 
negative sign but is s ta tis tica lly  insignificant.
Our evidence suggests that the monetary authorities in Canada
reacted systematically to variations in the output gap, budget
surplus, and short-term interest rate for the sample period under
consideration. However, none of these variables had the anticipated 
sign. Monetary expansion also followed a seasonal pattern, as is
evident from the signficance of seasonal duirany variables.
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Table 25. Definition of Variables: Canada
MS
iR
AIR
a UN
OG
OR
aEXR
aEEXR
P
Ar
SUR
= Quarterly rate of change of the monetary base, period t .
= Quarterly rate of change of international reserves, period t .
= Quarterly changes in international reserves, periot t .
= Quarterly changes in the unemployment rate, period t .
= Output Gap, period t .
= Output ratio , period t
= Quarterly changes in the index of b ilateral exchange rate
between Canadian dollar and American do llar, period t .
= Quarterly changes in the Index of effective exchange' 
rate, peri.od t .
= Quarterly rate of change in prices, period t .
= Quarterly changes in short-term interest rate (treasury-bill
rate) period t .
= Detrended budget surplus
[Nominal budget surplus^, period t .
Trend real GNP x IPD 
T O
DEBTt  = Detrended change in Government Debt
rA Nominal Government Debt-,, period t .
[  Trend real GNP x IPD— J
T O
Clt  = Quarterly rate of change in wages, period t .
aB0PNT+ = Quarterly changes in balance of payments, net trade, period 
z t .
aB0PCB+ = Quarterly changes in balance of payments, current balance, 
period t .
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Table 26. Determination o f Lag Length and Specific  G ravity o f
Manipulated Variables in  B ivaria te  Equations: Canada
M&t  =
3
C + Z a.Dj 
i= l 1 1
12
+ E K  K  n*
n=0 " ‘ • n
Variable Minimum Lag R2 Specific
(X) FPE Length Gravity
0G .00028739 0 .832662 3479.47
OR .00029353 0 .832106 3407.15
AUN .00032922 0 .808307 3037.67
SUR .00029201 5 .838071 3424.66
DEBT .00033836 0 .802985 2955.08
AEEXR .00032247 0 .812237 3100.77
aexr .00033533 0 .804747 2982.40
p .00032109 0 .813041 3114.29
Ar .00033041 7 .820199 3026.63
V1 .00031335 1 .806903 3191.83
ABOPNT .00033181 8 .821113 3013.86
ABOPCB .00033512 4 .810553 2984.18
AIR .00033516 0 .804851 2983.29
Ift .00033653 0 .804051 2971.77
Variables are defined in Table 25.
All equations have the functional form given at the top of this Table.
Table 27. Determination o f Lag Length and Specific  G ravity of
Manipulated Variables in T r iv a r ia te  Equations: Canada
M6t = C f  £ . ,0 ,  + 0Gt  U l „  Xt . n
Manipulated «
Controlled Variables Minimum Lag R Specific
Variable (X) FPE Length   Gravity
0G(0)
SUR .00023834 3 .866561 4196.39
DEBT .00029019 5 .840596 3445.90
AEEXR .00027688 0 .840382 3611.41
aexr .00028878 0 .833518 3463.80
IR .00028032 10 .852952 3567.61
AIR .00028427 10 .850881 3517.41
abopnt .00028634 10 .849795 3492.84
aBOPCB .00029109 4 .838582j • . 3435.25
Ar .00024380 8 .869768 4101.72
A .00028700 2 .837759 3484.32
P .00029132 1 .833699 3432.89
aThe number in parentheses beside the controlled variable is the 
optimal order of the lags (in quarters).
Variables are defined in Table 25.
A ll equations have the functional form given a t the top o f th is  Table.
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Table 28. Determination o f Lag Length and Specific  Gravity o f the
Manipulated Variables in M u ltiv a ria te  Equations: Canada
3 3 12
MB. = C + Z a.D. + a. OG. + I  a9. SUR. . + E 8 X. 
t  i= i 1 1 1 z k=0 t_K n=0 n T‘
— Manipulated
Controlled Variables 
Variable (X)
Minimum
FPE
Lag R 
Length ___
Specific
Gravity
0G(0)
SUR(3)
Ar .00021652 4 .884338 4618.94
P .00023377 2 .872887 4277.16
W .00024318 0 .865148 4111.84
AEEXR .00022974 0 .872602 4353.50
AEXR .00024268 0 .865424 4120.31
ABOPNT .00023621 1 .870247 4233.70
ABOPCB .00023912 4 .872267 4182.35
IR .00024233 4 .870549 4127.11
AIR .00024246 4 .870479 4123.71
aThe numbers in parentheses beside the controlled variables are the 
optimal order of the lags (in quarters).
Variables are defined in Table 25.
A ll equations have the functional form given a t the top o f th is  Table.
103
Table 29. Determination o f Lag Length and S pecific  G ravity o f the
Manipulated Variables in M u ltiv a ria te  Equations: Canada
3 . 3  1 12
MS. = C + E a.D. + a, 0G+ + E SUR+ . + E a -  Ar. . + E 0n X+ n. 
z i= i 1 1 L z k=0 Z~K k=0 n=0 t "n
Manipulated Z
Controlled Variable Minimum Lag Length R Specific
Variable (X)________ FPE (in quarters)   Gravity
0G(0)
SUR(3)
Ar(4)
p .00021272 2 .889414 4701.46
AEEXR .00021282 0 .887349 4699.25
AEXR .00021905 0 .884048 4566.21
Ift .00021886 0 .884150 4568.29
AIR .00022076 0 .883145 4528.98
(I .00022107 0 .882981 4522.84
ABOPCB .00022112 0 .882956 4522.84
abopnt .00022117 0 .882930 4522.84
aThe numbers in parentheses beside the controlled variables are the 
optimal order of the lags (in quarters).
Variables are defined in Table 25.
A ll equations have the functional form given a t the top o f th is  Table.
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Table 30. Determination o f Lag Length and Specific  G ravity o f
Manipulated Variables in M u ltiv a ria te  Equations: Canada
Mfi, =
° 1“i Di + al  ° Gt  +kf 0a2k SURt"k +kfo33k Art"k +k=034k f t “k +
12
E
n=0 n t "n
Manipulated I
Controlled Variable Minimum Lag Length R Specific
Variable (X) FPE (in quarters)   Gravity
0G(0)
SUR(3)
Ar(4)
Hz)
AEEXR .00020893 0 .892341 4784.69
AEXR .00021154 0 .890998 4716.98
Ift .00021230 0 .890608 4716.98
AIR .00021498 0 .889225 4651.16
Cl .00021684 0 .888268 4578.75
ABOPCB .00021730 0 .888031 4601.93
abopnt .00021734 0 .888012 4601.93
aThe numbers in parentheses beside the controlled variables are the 
optimal order of the lags (in quarters).
Variables are defined in Table 25.
A ll equations have the functional form given a t the top o f th is  Table.
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Table 31. Determination o f Lag Length and Specific  G ravity o f the
Manipulated Variables in M u ltiva ria te  Equations: Canada
M&t  = C +i f 1“i Di + al  0Gt  +kf 0a2k SURt-k  +kf 0a3k Art-k  \ f na4k Pt-k  +
12
aR AEEXR. + £ 8n X. n.
5 t  n=0 n t_n
2
£
k=0
: Manipulated Z
Controlled Variable Minimum Lag Length R Specific
Variable (X) FPE (in quarters)   Gravity
0G(0)
SUR(3)
Ar(4)
P(2)
AEEXR(O)
IR .00021007 0 .892707 4759.64
AIR .00021231 0 .891559 4710.32
W .00021301 0 .891203 4694.62
ABOPCB .00021327 0 .891073 4688.23
ABOPNT .00021350 0 .890952 4683.84
aThe numbers in parentheses beside the controlled variables are the 
optimal order of the lags (in quarters).
Variables are defined in Table 25.
A ll equations have the functional form given a t the top o f th is  Table.
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Table 32. Determination o f Lag Length and Specific  G ravity o f the
Manipulated Variables in M u ltiv a ria te  Equations: Canada
H6t  = C + J i «j Dj + aj 0Gt  +j oa2k SURt _k + Art . k f>t _k +
12
a5 AEEXRt  + a6 J^t +nE06n Xt-n*
Manipulated «
Controlled Variable Minimum Lag Length R Specific
Variable (X) FPE (in quarters)   Gravity
0G(0)
SUR(3)
Ar(4)
P ( 2 )
AEEXR(O)
lft(0)
ABOPNT .00021338 0 .891962 4686.03
abopcb .00021404 .0 .891628 4672.90
A .00021407 0 .891615 4670.71
aThe numbers in parentheses beside the controlled variables are the 
optimal order of the lags (in quarters).
Variables are defined in Table 25.
A ll equations have the functional form given a t the top o f th is  Table.
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Table 33. Determination o f Lag Length and S pecific  G ravity o f the
Manipulated Variables in M u ltiv a ria te  Equations: Canada
3 3 4 2
Mfit  = C +i f 1“i Di + al 0Gt  +kf 0a2k SURt-k  +kf 0a3k Art-k  +k! Qa4k Rt-k  +
12
a5 AEEXR^  + ag Ifit  + a7 aBOPNTj. Xt-n*
: : Manipulated o
Controlled Variable Minimum Lag Length R Specific
Variable (X) FPE (in quarters) ___ Gravity
06(0)
SUR(3)
Ar(4)
m
aeexr(o)
Ift(O) '
ABOPNT(O)
til .00021814 0 .890505 4584.21
aThe numbers in parentheses beside the controlled variables are the 
optimal order of the lags (in quarters).
Variables are defined in Table 25.
A ll equations have the functional form given a t the top o f th is  Table.
Table 34. Estimation Results Using Canadian Data -  Honey Supply Reaction Function: 1960:2 -  1983:4.
3 3 4 2
* * t  “ C +^ 1°1 D1 + al  “ t  +k^ 0a2k SURt-k  +k=0a3k Art -k  +k=Qa4k * t - k  + a5 A EEXRt  + a6 !^ t + a7 AB0PNTt  + a8 V
Eq. C 
No. °1 “ 2 °3 al a2 a3 a4 a5 a6 a7 a8
R* D-W
(34.1) .0708* -.1019* -.0217* -.0560* .0025*
* *
.7105 -.0096* -.1374 .0002 .0203 .0021 -.0075 .89 1.83
(14.49) (-20.42) (- .4 .6 8 ) (-12.38) (4.68) (1.91) (r2 .53 ) (-.4 9 ) (1.53) (1.22) (.49 ) (- .4 8 )
(34.2) .0715* -.1029* -.0219* -.0557* .0024* .7474* -.0096* -.1512 .89 1.91
(15.61) (-23.11) (-4 .78) (-12.36) (4.62) (2.11) (-2 .55) ( -.6 1 )
(34.3) .0723* -.0962* -.0176* -.0533* .0030* .8596 -.0100 -.2376 .00007 .0192 .0100 -.1338 .87 1.70
(7.36) (-12.13) (-2 .38) (-8 .00) (3.36) (1.16) (-1 .40 ) ( - .2 6 ) (.12 ) (.44 ) (1 .04) ( - .1 6 )
(34.4) .0719* -.1021* -.0201* -.0542* .0026*
* *
.7233 -.0087** -.2516 .89 1.91
(14.39) (-20.92) (-3 .24) (-9 .26) (3.63) (1.87) (-1 .65 ) ( - .7 9 )
Notes:
Figures In  parentheses are t-stat1st1cs o f the coeffic ien ts .
2 2R ■ R adjusted fo r degrees o f freedom.
Variables are defined In Table 25.
An *  Indicates significance a t the 5X level and * *  Indicates significance a t the 10X le ve l.
(34.1) and (34.2) have been estimated with OLS while (34.3) and (34.4) have been estimated with IV procedure.
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Table 35. Money Supply Reaction Function: Canada
Estimation Period: 1960:2 -  1983:4.
Method of Estimation: Instrumental Variable Technique
Dependent Variable: M&t  = Log [MBt /MBt _ j] .
Explanatory Estimated T-Statistic
Variable Coefficient
C .071953 14.3899
Dj -.102112 -20.9224
D2 -.020069 -3.2399
D0 -.054184 -9.2631
0G
SUR
Ar
.002647 3.6321
t  -.431229 -.5154
t-1  .563729 .8763
t-2  -1.552321 -2.8551
t-3  2.143167 3.9794
t  -.000661 -.2209
t-1  -.003169 -1.9767
t-2  +.000460 .2260
t-3  -.000649 -.4178
t-4  -.007418 -2.9066
t  .440376 .5972
Table 35 (continued).
Explanatory
Variable
t-1
t-2
Estimated
Coefficient
-.301592
-.390392
T-Statistic
-.6738
-1.0037
Standard Error of the Regression = .042165
R2 = .91 
R2 = .89 
D-W Statis tic  =1 .91  
No. of Observations = 95 
F-Statistic (16,78) = 47.7162
Variables are defined in Table 25.
Table 36. Multivariate F-Tests for Joint Significance of Coefficients
M6t  = C +i f 1ai Di + al  0Gt  +kf 0a2k SURt-k  +kf 0a3k APt“k +
2
k?0a4k ^ " k + a5 AEEXRt  + a6 ^ t  + a7 AB0PNTt  a8 ^t*
Hypothesis F-Statisties
1. aj = 0 21.96 (1,74)
2. a20 = a21 = a22 = a23 = 0 5.80 (4 ,74)*
3. a30 = a31 = a32 = a33 = a34 = 0
. * *  
3.24 (5,74)
4. a40 a41 = a42 = 0 2.44 (3,74)
5. a5 B 0 2.35 (1,74)
6. a6 = 0 1.48 (1,74)
7. a^ = 0 .24 (1,74)
8. a8 = 0 0.002 (1,74)
An *  indicates significance at the 1% level, while a * *  indicates 
significance at the 5% level. Hypotheses 4 is rejected at the 10% level 
of significance.
Figures 1n parentheses besides the calculated F -statis tic  represent the 
degrees of freedom for the F-test for the numerator and the denominator 
respectively.
Variables are defined in Table 25.
CHAPTER V
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The primary objective of this study was to estimate the money- 
supply reaction function for the United Kingdom, West Germany and 
Canada. The general model developed in Chapter I I I  showed the 
quarterly rate of change in the monetary base as being determined by a 
linear function of economic variables. No £  priori restriction was 
imposed on the model in terms of a predetermined lag structure. The 
minimum final prediction error criterion in conjunction with the 
specific gravity criterion was used to determine the optimal lag in 
the response of the monetary authorities to changes in the goal 
variables. Reaction functions were f ir s t  estimated for the U.K. and 
West Germany with OLS combined with the Cochrane-Orcutt serial 
correlation correction. These equations were then reestimated using 
the instrumental variable technique combined with the Cochrane-Orcutt 
serial correlation correction procedure. Reaction functions for the 
Bank of Canada were estimated with the OLS and IV procedures, since no 
problems with serial correlation were found.
Table 37 summarizes the findings of this study by identifying 
whether changes in the short-term interest rate, the unemployment 
rate, the output gap, the international reserves, the effective  
exchange rate, the trade balance, the balance of payments (in the 
current account), the wage rate, the inflation rate and the budget 
surplus have affected monetary policy in each of the countries. Rows
112
(1 ), (2 ), (3) and (4) summarize the influence of external balance 
measures on monetary policy. The money supply policies in the United 
Kingdom and West Germany have been permanently affected by some 
external trade balance measure—the effective exchange rate and/or the 
international reserves. In addition to the international reserves 
variable, the German authority responded temporarily to the trade 
balance variable by following restrictive monetary policies. These 
results suggest that the Bundesbank was trying to maintain external 
s tab ility  by making permanent and temporary adjustments in monetary 
policy. The monetary base responded positively to an increase in the
index of the effective exchange rate.
A procyclical response to the unemployment variable (West 
Germany) and the output gap variable (Canada) is indicated. The
output gap variable has a positive sign and is significant for Canada 
at the 5 % level of confidence. The positive sign on the output gap 
variable indicates a procyclical response. That is , the monetary base 
was expanded in response to an increase in demand for money that
accompanies an upswing in the level of economic ac tiv ity . Changes in 
the unemployment rate variable exerted no lasting effect on the Mfi in 
West Germany (since the sum of coefficients on this variable is 
insignificant), but some temporary procyclical adjustments in the 
monetary base took place (as is evident from one significant negative 
lagged coefficient).
Concerning a monetary response to fiscal actions, the results are 
mixed. The sum of coefficients on the budget surplus variable is 
insignificant for the U.K. ruling out a permanent or lasting 
relationship between the budget surplus and the money supply. However,
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a study of the individual lagged coefficients on the budget surplus 
variable reveals the presence of one individual significant negative 
coefficient. A negative budget surplus-money supply linkage suggests 
that the central bank in the U.K. accommodates, at least temporarily, 
an increase in the public sector borrowing requirements. The fiscal 
policy variable exerted no significant influence on monetary policy in 
West. Germany. An explanation for this is found in the institutional 
framework of the Bundesbank. The central bank of West Germany has 
exhibited substantial independence in the post world war period. The 
government is responsible for fiscal policy while the Bundesbank is 
solely responsible for designing and executing monetary policy. The 
monetary authority in Canada has responded in an oscillatory fashion 
to changes in the fiscal policy variable. The response of the 
monetary authority to a unit change in the budget surplus (as a ratio  
of trend real GNP) is distributed over four quarters. While for the 
f ir s t  two quarters no significant response is detected, in the third 
quarter the central bank reduces the growth rate of the monetary base. 
However, in the next period a significant increase in MS is noted, and 
this effect is so significant that the sum of coefficients on the 
budget surplus variable is significant at the 10£ level. The Canadian 
central bank seems to respond more to the macro consequences of the 
change in surplus than to the money consequences of the increase in 
the surplus.
The sum of coefficients on the short-run interest rate variable 
is found to be negatively related to policy actions in Canada. I t  is 
d iff ic u lt  to explain this result as i t  seems to indicate that the 
Canadian central bank used monetary policy to reinforce rather than to
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stabilize the financial market fluctuations. Financial market 
variables ( i . e . ,  changes in the short-term interest rate) had some 
temporary effect on the monetary policy in the U.K., as is evident 
from a significant positive individual coefficient on the short-term 
interest rate variable, even though variations in the short-term 
interest rate did not exercise a lasting impact on the monetary 
policy.
One surprising result of the study is the insignificant 
coefficient on the inflation rate variable for the United Kingdom and 
West Germany. I t  might be expected that inflation would be one of the 
most important determinants of monetary policy because of the 
relatively strong public concern expressed over an accelerating price 
level. No support for the wage push hypothesis has been established.
Table 37 also shows how the lag length over which monetary 
authorities adjust to changes in economic variables differs among 
countries. Rather than imposing arbitrary restrictions on the model in 
terms of predetermined lag length, the information contained in the 
data set has been used to determine the actual lags in policy actions. 
This variable lag pattern allows greater degrees of freedom than is 
experienced with the imposition of equal lag length on a ll the 
independent variables.
The estimated reaction functions indicate that the monetary 
policies in the United Kingdom and West Germany have been permanently 
affected by some external trade balance measure—the effective  
exchange rate in the former case and international reserves in the 
la tte r. Other economic variables under consideration have no lasting 
impact on the formulation of monetary policy in the U.K. and West
Germany. The monetary base in Canada is affected by changes in the 
output gap, interest rate changes and budget deficits.
117
Table 37. A Summary Matrix of the Signs and Significance of Sums of
Coefficients: 1960:2 -  1983:4.
Independent
Variable
United 
Ki ngdom
West
Germany
Canada
(1) IR 0(1) +(0) na
(2) AEEXR
. **  
+(2) 0(1) na
(3) ‘ ATB na 0(3)b na
(4) ABOPCB na na na
(5) AUN 0(0) 0(3)b na
(6) OG na na +(0)
(7) W na na na
(8) Ar 0(4)a na
. , ★★ 
-(4 )
(9) P na na 0(2)
(10) SUR 0(6)b na +(3)C**
Notes:
In this table the sign and the significance of the sum of the 
coefficients on different explanatory variables is reported.
+, - ,  and 0 denote a positive significant, a negative significant, 
and an insignificant sum of coefficients respectively.
An *  denotes significance at the 5 percent level; the double 
asterisk * *  denotes significance at the 10 percent level.
For some explanatory variables the sum of the coefficient is not 
s ta tis tic a lly  significant, but one or more individual lagged 
coefficients are significant. The superscripts (a ), (b ), and (c) 
denote the significance (at the 10 percent level) of one or more 
positive individual coefficients, negative Individual 
coefficients, and one or more coefficients of both signs 
respectively.
Figures 1n parentheses refer to the appropriate lag length (in  
quarters).
na: not applicable; these variables are not included as 
explanatory variables in the restricted model.
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APPENDIX
DEFINITION OF VARIABLES, BY COUNTRY
All variables are seasonally unadjusted unless mentioned otherwise.
The unit of observation for a ll variables is a quarter. Data has 
been drawn from International Financial Statistics (IMF), Main Economic 
Indicators (OECD), and Main Economic Indicators; Historical Statistics  
(OECD).
I . United Kingdom
MB = Reserve Money, millions of pounds sterling.
Source: IFS.
TBRpA = Treasury b ill  rate, 91 days, per cent per annum period 
average; IFS.
TBRp£ = Treasury b il l  rate, per cent per annum, 91 days, period end; 
OECD.
W = Hourly earnings in manufacturing; 1975=100; OECD.
U = Unemployment as percent of c iv ilian  labor force; OECD.
CPI = Consumer price index, a ll items, 1975=100; OECD.
WPI = Wholesale price index (manufacturing output): total
excluding food, beverages and tobacco, 1975=100; OECD.
EXR = U.S. dollar per pound sterling, market rate/par or central 
rate, end of period; IFS.
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t = Index of effective exchange rate. I t  is a measure
of changes in the effective exchange rate. I t  is an index 
combining the currency in question and twenty other major 
currencies with weights derived from the Fund's Multilateral 
Exchange Rate Model (MERM); IFS.
IR = O fficial reserves: to ta l, m illion, SDR's end of period;
OECD.
TB = Trade Balance (fo b -c if), millions of pound sterling per 
quarter, seasonally adjusted; OECD.
BOP = Balance of payments; net trade, millions of pound sterling  
per quarter; OECD.
IPD = Implicit price deflator, 1975=100, seasonally adjusted;
OECD.
GDP = Gross domestic product at factor cost, millions of pound 
sterling, annual rates, seasonally adjusted; OECD.
SUR = Actual budget d e fic it ( - )  or surplus (+ ), billions of pound
sterling per quarter; IMF. (Data on this variable is on a
cash-flow basis).
West Germany
MB = Reserve money, millions of Deutsche mark, IFS.
r = Call money rates, per cent per annum, end of period; OECD.
W = Hourly earnings in manufacturing, 1975=100; OECD.
U = Unemployment (registerd unemployed) as percent of c iv ilian  
labor force; OECD.
CPI = Consumer price index, a ll items, 1975=100; OECD.
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EXR = Exchange rate, Deutsche mark per U.S. dollar, par or central 
rate, end of period. EEXR = Index of effective exchange 
rate; IFS.
IR = O ffic ial reserves: to ta l, million SDR's end of period; OECD. 
(O fficia l reserves comprise of gross holdings of special 
drawings rights and foreign exchange plus gold holdings plus 
reserve position in the IMF).
BOP = Balance of payments, current balance, million Deutsche marks; 
OECD.
TB = Trade balance (fob -c if) b illio n  DM, monthly averages, OECD. 
IPD = Im plicit price deflator, 1975=100; OECD.
DEBT = Government debt, billions of Deutsche marks; IFS.
DEF = D eficit ( - )  or Surplus (+ ), billions of Deutsche marks; IFS
I I I .  Canada
MB = Reserve money, b illions of Canadian $; IFS.
TBR = Treasury b il l  rate, 91 days, per cent per annum, end of 
period; OECD.
W = Hourly earnings in manufacturing (seasonally adjusted);
OECD.
U = Unemployment as percent of c iv ilian  labor force (seasonally 
adjusted); OECD.
CPI = Consumer price index, a ll Items, 1975=100; OECD.
EXR = Exchange rate, end of period, Canadian $ per U.S. $; IFS.
EEXR = Effective exchange rate; IFS.
IR = O fficial reserves: to ta l, million SDR's end of period; IFS.
(Total o ffic ia l reserves include gross holdings of special
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drawing rights and foreign exchange plus gold holdings plus 
reserve position in IMF).
BOP = Balance of payments, net trade, billions of Canadian $; OECD. 
B0Pj,g = Balance of payments, current balance, billions of Canadian $; 
OECD.
GNP = Gross National Product at factor cost, billions of Canadian $ 
annual rates, seasonally adjusted; OECD.
IDP = Gross domestic product im plicit price deflator, 1975=100, 
seasonally adjusted; OECD.
RGNP = Real GNP at 1975 market price, seasonally adjusted; IFS.
DEBT = Total outstanding debt of government, billions of Canadian $, 
IFS.
SUR = Actual surplus (+) or deficits ( - ) ;  billions of Canadian $; 
Statistics Canada, National Income and Expenditure Accounts,
Several Volumes.
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